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This thesis examines the rationales behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
decision to intervene in Ukraine through the lenses of neoclassical realism and prospect 
theory. The risk-acceptant decision to employ hybrid warfare in Crimea was 
fundamentally due to Putin’s loss aversion. Since Putin frames his political decision-
making reference point in the realm of losses, his decision sought to prevent the 
imminent losses of Ukraine’s Russian-oriented government, Russia’s influence in 
Ukraine, and Putin’s own political power at home. It also sought to somewhat recover 
from the “catastrophic” loss of the Soviet Union’s territorial possessions, population, and 
status. Putin exploited Western leaders’ naiveté and vulnerabilities to prepare a 
geopolitical landscape wherein Russia could act without incurring excessive costs. 
Emboldened by Russia’s large financial reserves and backed by Russia’s seemingly 
irrational threats of cutting off essential European gas supplies and launching nuclear 
attacks, Putin correctly anticipated a limited economic sanctions response and a 
negligible military response from the West. Putin’s decision furthered Russia’s interests 
by acquiring Crimea, the strategically indispensable port of Sevastopol, and vast Black 
Sea region resources. Such action also thwarted the expansion of Western institutions in 
Ukraine and incited fervent Russian ethno-nationalism, boosting Putin’s domestic 
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Russia’s 2014 military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea 
constituted a watershed in the post–Cold War European security order. From the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 to its 2014 intervention, Russia had shown some promise of 
cooperating with the West, such as its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace program and the NATO–Russia Council. In 
1994, Russia gave Ukraine security assurances in return for Ukraine’s transfer of its 
Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia, providing for Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Russia 
completely disregarded these assurances in its annexation of Crimea and continuing 
intervention in Ukraine.  
As a result of its actions, Russia has faced significant international economic and 
diplomatic blowback. Why did Russia intervene in Ukraine and annex a part of its 
sovereign territory? What benefits did Russia hope to achieve that would compensate for 
the anticipated costs that it was bound to incur for its actions? 
Understanding the Russian government’s motives and decision making is 
important for United States, European Union (EU), and NATO policy makers as they 
deal with Moscow concerning the ongoing Ukraine crisis and potential further crises in 
the post-Soviet space. Central and Eastern European NATO member countries are 
justifiably concerned about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, partly because some of them host 
sizable ethnic Russian minority populations. The crisis has substantially altered the post–
Cold War security order in Europe and renewed the focus on collective defense readiness 
within NATO. The Allies have recognized the threat posed by an aggressive and 
emboldened revisionist Russia.1 
This chapter reviews the circumstances in Ukraine that precipitated the Russian 
government’s decision to intervene in Ukraine and also provides an overview of the 
                                                 
1 Michael Rühle, “NATO and the Ukraine Crisis,” American Foreign Policy Interests 37 (2015): 80, 
doi: 10.1080/10803920.2015.1038925. 
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Russian intervention. Additionally, it surveys the relevant international relations theory 
literature. The thesis focuses on explanations for Russia’s decision to intervene at 
different levels of analysis but concentrates on the actor responsible for the decision. It 
also assesses the extent of the actor’s rationality—a major assumption of rational choice 
theory. Finally, it weighs the applicability of rational choice theory and an alternative 
psychological model known as prospect theory. 
A. UKRAINIAN EUROMAIDAN AND RUSSIAN INTERVENTION 
Prior to the crisis, two economic and political centers of gravity, the EU and 
Russia, attempted to pull Ukraine from its precarious balancing perch into their own 
orbits. Trapped in the middle, Ukraine continued to rely on both for its foreign trade. In 
2012, the EU and Russia received 25% and 26%, respectively, of Ukraine’s $68 billion 
exports and provided 31% and 32%, respectively, of Ukraine’s $84.7 billion imports.2 
The constant tug-of-war between Ukraine’s two major trade partners gave rise to a pro-
Western movement in November 2013. After Moscow employed heavy-handed 
economic pressure, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych reversed a decision to sign 
an association agreement with the EU, effectively moving Ukraine closer to Russia and 
away from the EU and the West. His decision led several hundred pro-EU protesters to 
gather at downtown Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square. Yanukovych 
was initially unconcerned about the demonstration, but when it failed to fizzle out, he 
employed repressive tactics by dispatching riot police to clear the square.3 Such action 
only fueled the fire of the opposition, causing it to grow rapidly. After increased violence 
that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 protesters, the Euromaidan movement 
culminated in the political collapse and flight of Ukraine’s president on February 22, 
2014. 
                                                 
2 “Ukraine’s Trading Partners: EU and Russian Federation Equally Important,” Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Destatis, February 25, 2014, https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/InFocus/International/
UkraineTradingPartners.html.  
3 Serhiy Kudelia, “The House That Yanukovych Built,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014): 28, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v025/25.3.kudelia.pdf. 
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Amid the resultant political uncertainty and weakness in Ukraine, Russia made its 
move in Crimea through what has been termed hybrid warfare. “Little green men,” 
highly disciplined troops in uniforms without insignia who were later confirmed to be 
Russian soldiers, appeared in Sevastopol, Simferopol, and other Crimean cities. 
Additionally, Moscow employed elements of information warfare—including cyber 
attacks and propaganda—and economic coercion. On March 16, 2014, pro-Russian 
advocates in Crimea hastily organized a referendum for Crimea to secede from Ukraine 
and to join Russia. The referendum passed with a reported overwhelming Russian-
oriented majority. On March 18, 2014, 24 days after Yanukovych’s flight, Russia 
formalized Crimea’s annexation into the Russian Federation. Russia has also 
clandestinely supported separatists in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine in their 
efforts to follow suit. Unlike their Crimean neighbors, however, they have not succeeded 
and the conflict in the Donbas continues to the present. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW: RETURN TO REALISM? 
“The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must,” wrote 
Thucydides.4 Russia’s use of hybrid warfare against its weaker sovereign neighbor 
illustrates this point, raising the question: why did Russia do it? For the classical realist, 
understanding human nature and the world of competing interests, or rivalries over 
power, is essential in attempting to answer such a question.5 In his 1651 treatise 
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes identified three principal causes of quarrel in the nature of 
man—competition, fear, and glory: “the first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, 
for safety; and the third, for reputation.”6 He described the state of war that exists among 
men in the absence of a common civil power, which is apposite to the anarchic 
international structure in which all states find themselves. Centuries earlier, Thucydides 
                                                 
4 Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue,” in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. Richard K. Betts (Boston: 
Pearson, 2013), 70. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993), 3, 5, 11; Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism,” The 
Review of Politics 54, no. 2 (1992): 286, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407486. 
6 Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature and the State of War,” in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. 
Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 79–80. 
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attributed the causes of war to three of the strongest motives: fear, honor, or interest.7 The 
Spartans declared war on the Athenians in 431 B.C., he argued, because they “feared the 
growth of the power of the Athenians.”8 Historian Martin Wight expounds upon this 
argument:  
Every belligerent has complex motives. . . . By fear we mean, not an 
unreasoning emotion, but a rational apprehension of future evil, and this is 
the prime motive of international politics. For all powers at all times are 
concerned primarily with their security, and most powers at most times 
find their security threatened.9 
The idea of security, along with the anarchic international system, forms the bedrock of 
structural realism, or neorealism. 
1. Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism 
Unlike classical realism, which seeks to explain international outcomes as a result 
of the “forces inherent in human nature,” neorealism seeks to explain the same outcomes 
by focusing on the anarchic structure of state relations and how states seek to survive in 
such a system.10 A major critique of neorealism is that it cannot predict the behavior of 
individual states because its main unit of analysis is the system itself. Neoclassical 
realism seeks to fill the void. As Jeffrey Taliaferro observes, neoclassical realism predicts 
how states respond to anarchic imperatives: “Phenomena such as individual states’ grand 
strategies, military doctrines, foreign economic policy, alliance preferences, and crisis 
behavior fall within [its] purview.”11 Instead of merely focusing on structural variables, 
neoclassical realism includes explanatory variables at the unit level.12 Neorealism and 
neoclassical realism attempt to explain disparate results, namely international outcomes 
                                                 
7 Thucydides, in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, trans. 
Richard Crawley, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 43. 
8 Ibid., 43, 49. 
9 Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University 
Press, 1978), 138–139. 
10 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: 
Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000): 135, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2626708. 
11 Ibid., 134. 
12 Ibid. 
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and the external actions of individual states, respectively.13 Both are divided into two 
competing camps that seek to explain the means of state survival in the anarchic 
system—offensive and defensive realism. 
a. Offensive Realism 
The point of discord between the two schools of offensive and defensive realism 
lies in whether states seek to maximize their power relative to others or if states seek to 
maintain the status quo in the anarchic international system.14 The main tenet of offensive 
realism is that states rationally seek opportunities to expand and maximize their power 
whether confronted by specific threats or not.15 Eric Labs differentiates between two 
types of expansion that states pursue: automatic and manual.16 Automatic expansion 
occurs when states are presented with an opportunity to cheaply and easily increase their 
relative power whereas manual expansion occurs when a state deliberately attempts to 
achieve hegemony, like Nazi Germany’s attempt to dominate Europe during World War 
II.17 Labs explains that automatic expansion does not imply determinism but that “each 
bit of expansion is logical and rational in light of the incentives created by an anarchic 
international system.”18 He also emphasizes that all states are not the same and that 
“stronger states are more likely to pursue expansion than weak states because, all other 
things being equal, they are more able to do so.”19 The inclination of a major nuclear 
power like Russia to automatically expand when given the opportunity in Ukraine adds 
validity to the explanatory power of offensive realism, but it does not account for why 
certain states exhibit manual or automatic expansionist tendencies. 
                                                 
13 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy,” 134. 
14 Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security 
Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 4, doi: 10.1080/09636419708429321. 
15 Ibid., 5. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 12–13. 
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b. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realism holds that states seek survival and maximize their security by 
maintaining the status quo. The anarchic international system provides little incentive for 
states to expand except when such actions address specific threats that undermine the 
status quo.20 Robert Jervis describes how security dilemmas often develop when one 
state’s increase in security leads to a decrease in the security of others.21 Taliaferro 
explains that “pairs of states may pursue security-seeking strategies but inadvertently 
generate spirals of mutual hostility or conflict. States often, although not always, pursue 
expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that aggression is the only 
way to make their states secure.”22 According to the logic of defensive realism, Russian 
leaders truly believed that intervening in Ukraine would make Russia more secure 
because of the looming threat of a more Western-oriented Ukraine.  
c. Balance of Interests Theory 
A criticism of neorealism is that defensive and offensive realists alike have 
difficulty in explaining why some states tend to maintain the status quo while others tend 
to maximize relative power. Randall Schweller’s balance of interests theory attempts to 
do just that by bridging the theoretical divide between offensive and defensive realists 
and traversing the continuum between neorealism and neoclassical realism. The theory 
attributes revisionist and status quo interests to unit-level variables. Schweller explains 
that status quo states seek to maximize their security and preserve the resources they 
control; revisionist states, on the other hand, “seek to undermine the established order for 
the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system; that is, they seek to 
increase, not just to maintain, their resources. For these states, the gains from non-
security expansion exceeds the cost of war.”23 Schweller uses jungle animals to analogize 
                                                 
20 Labs, “Beyond Victory,” 9–11. 
21 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” in Conflict After the Cold War, ed. 
Richard K. Betts (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 425. 
22 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy,” 129. 
23 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 24. 
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the types of behavior states exhibit based on their capability and interests, which range 
from unlimited aims for revision to strongly supporting the status quo. Wolves, foxes, 
and jackals represent states with varying degrees of revisionist aims while lions, owls, 
and hawks strongly support the status quo.24 Frederick Schuman aptly describes why 
states might pursue such diverse interests:  
States which feel humiliated, hampered, and oppressed by the status quo 
seek as naturally to modify it. Satiated states are therefore likely to appear 
“pacific.” They are committed to peace. They demand “security,” for they 
are content with the equilibrium which peace and security will perpetuate. 
Unsatiated states demand changes, rectifications of frontiers, a revision of 
treaties, a redistribution of territory and power. In so far as the fulfillment 
of these demands is resisted by status quo states, in so far as this resistance 
makes possible their realization only through coercion and conflict, such 
states appear to be “aggressive” and lacking in enthusiasm for peace.25 
Does Russia represent an unsatiated, limited-aims revisionist fox or a jackal that 
feels “humiliated, hampered, and oppressed by the status quo?”26 Through the years, 
Putin has repeatedly expressed disdain for “attempts to establish a unipolar world,” and in 
2005, he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the century.”27 Or was Russia’s intervention an effort to maintain the 
status quo as it was about to change through a more Western-oriented Ukraine?  
2. Contemporary Realist Arguments 
A survey of the contemporary neorealist thought pertaining to the Ukraine crisis 
provides answers to such questions. Defensive realist Stephen Walt argues that “major 
powers care a lot about security and are often ruthless in defending vital interests, 
                                                 
24 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 84–89. 
25 Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Destiny of the Western State System, 4th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), 378–379. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Vladimir V. Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy,” President of Russia, February 10, 2007, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/10/
0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml; Vladimir V. Putin, “Speech at Military 
Parade on Red Square in Moscow to Mark the 70th Anniversary of Victory in the 1941–1945 Great 
Patriotic War,” President of Russia, May 9, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49438; 
Vladimir V. Putin, “Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации,” Official Site of the 
President of Russia, Kremlin, April 25, 2005, http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/04/87049.shtml. 
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especially close to home. . . . Great powers ignore international law when it gets in their 
way. . . . Relations between major powers [are] a ceaseless struggle for position, even 
when that struggle is waged for essentially defensive reasons.”28 Walt contends that U.S. 
leaders failed to differentiate between Western power, with the subsequent promotion of 
its values, and Russian interests in Ukraine. As evidence of Washington’s agenda during 
the Euromaidan protests, he refers to the December 2013 incident when Victoria Nuland, 
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, handed out 
pastries to anti-government protesters in Kiev.29 The Euromaidan visit by U.S. Senators 
John McCain and Chris Murphy that same month, wherein McCain told an anti-
government crowd that he was there to support their “just cause” and that Ukraine’s 
“destiny lies with Europe,” provides further credence to the claim of Western 
interference.30 
Putin himself emphasized that the Russian intervention was intended to increase 
Russia’s security. He said that the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO “meant that 
NATO’s navy would be right there in this city [Sevastopol] of Russia’s military glory, 
and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern 
Russia.”31 However illusory the conjured threat may have been before, it is practically 
inconceivable in the wake of Russia’s intervention. 
Like Walt, fellow neorealist—albeit of the offensive variety—John Mearsheimer 
argues that NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and the West’s support for the pro-
democracy Euromaidan movement were critical elements for provoking Russian 
aggression against Ukraine.32 “Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After 
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29 Ibid. 
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all,” he reasons, “the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its 
core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly.”33 The venerable 
Henry Kissinger provides a classical realist perspective, stating that the policymakers of 
both the West and Russia are to blame: “Putin is a serious strategist—on the premises of 
Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor 
has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. 
policymakers.”34 As the trio of Kissinger, Mearsheimer, and Walt suggests, 
understanding Russian history and interests may provide contextual clues for analyzing 
Russia’s decision to intervene in Ukraine. 
a. Spheres of Interest 
Throughout its tsarist and Soviet history, Russia has been no stranger to spheres 
of influence. For most of the nineteenth century, the Russian empire engaged in a 
competition for influence known as the Great Game against its rival, the British Empire, 
in the Caucasus, Persia, and Central Asia.35 In the 1860s, the Russian empire expanded 
into Turkestan, encroaching upon the British Empire’s crown jewel colony of India. “The 
British had already fought two Afghan wars to keep Afghanistan as a no-man’s land 
between Russia and India,” explain historians R.R. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd 
Kramer.36 In the 1870s, expanding Russia “touched India itself but [was] kept away by an 
Anglo-Russian agreement, which allotted a long tongue of land to Afghanistan and so 
separated the Indian and Russian empires by 20 miles.”37 As the last major act in the 
Great Game, Britain and Russia signed another treaty in 1907 that divided Persia into 
distinct Russian and British spheres of influence. 
                                                 
33 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” 
34 Henry Kissinger, “To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End,” Washington Post, March 5, 2014, 
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(2009): 12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01636600903231089. 
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Much as its tsarist and Soviet predecessors jockeyed for influence in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, modern Russia is doing the same in its post-Soviet 
space. As Dmitri Trenin argues, Russia’s “current ambition is to become a full-fledged 
world power, one of a handful of more or less equal key players in the twenty-first 
century global system. Seen from that perspective, the former imperial borderlands of 
Russia are deemed to be both elements of its power center and a cushion to protect Russia 
itself from undesirable encroachments by other great powers.”38 Instead of spheres of 
influence, however, Russia seeks to maintain spheres of “privileged interest”—a phrase 
employed by President Dmitri Medvedev in the wake of Russia’s 2008 invasion of 
Georgia.39 According to Trenin, the Russian concept includes specific economic, 
politico-military, and cultural domains within the states of its near neighborhood.40 
b. Critiques of Realist Arguments 
Recognizing Russia’s insistence on maintaining its interests from both structural 
and state perspectives does not completely explain its expansionist motivation. Indeed, a 
key critique of realism is that it fails to address the inner workings of states. As Aaron 
Friedberg explains, “Structural considerations provide a useful point from which to begin 
the analysis of international politics rather than a place at which to end it. Even if one 
acknowledges that structures exist and are important, there is still the question of how 
statesmen grasp their counters from the inside.”41 Jack Snyder has expressed a similar 
criticism: “Realists are right in stressing power, interests, and coalition making . . . [but] 
have been wrong in looking exclusively to states as the irreducible atoms whose power 
and interests are to be assessed.”42 Examining the internal dynamics of Russian politics 
can provide a clearer picture of the Russian decision to intervene in Ukraine. 
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41 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 8. 
42 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19. 
 11
The critiques of the contemporary realist arguments for Russia’s action in Ukraine 
share in Snyder’s conclusion that “domestic pressures often outweigh international ones 
in the calculations of national leaders.”43 Michael McFaul, who served as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia from January 2012 to February 2014, argues that the NATO and 
EU expansion argument cannot explain the period of Russia’s cooperation with the West 
from 2009 to 2012. “Mearsheimer’s single variable of NATO expansion can’t explain 
both outcomes,” McFaul writes.44 “For the real story, one needs to look past the factor 
that has stayed constant and focus on what has changed: Russian politics.”45 McFaul 
argues that Putin’s fraudulent return to the Russian presidency in 2012, a return that 
triggered strong domestic discontent, was the factor that changed: “In an effort to 
mobilize his electoral base and discredit the opposition, Putin recast the United States as 
an enemy. . . . To sustain his legitimacy at home, Putin continued to need the United 
States as an adversary.”46 Stephen Sestanovich makes a similar argument: “Putin 
cultivates a mystique of cool, KGB professionalism, and the image has often served him 
well. But the Ukraine crisis has revealed a different style of decision-making. Putin made 
impulsive decisions that subordinated Russia’s national interest to his own political 
motives. He has not acted like a sober realist.”47 
Another counterargument to state-level realist interpretations is that the root of the 
crisis is a civilizational fissure between Russian and Ukrainian national identities. In 
1993, Samuel Huntington emphasized the shared historical and cultural heritage of 
Ukraine and Russia, but identified “the civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox 
eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine.”48 He surmised “the possibility of Ukraine 
splitting in half, a separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be 
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more violent than that of Czechoslovakia but far less bloody than that of Yugoslavia.”49 
The roles of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism, which have been significant in the 
unfolding and continuation of the crisis, must be included in analyzing the rationale for 
Russia’s actions. 
C. THE DECISION TO INTERVENE 
As the preceding arguments demonstrate, many scholars assume Putin to be the 
sole decision-maker for the Russian state, but some contend that such a view represents 
an inaccurate impression of how Russia is truly governed.50 To understand why Russia 
intervened in Ukraine, one must understand exactly who made the decision and who 
influenced it. Throughout its history, Russia has often been led by authoritarian leaders 
who have exercised patrimonialism, wherein government positions are filled not 
according to the objective Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic criterion of what one 
knows but according to the subjective patrimonial criterion of who one knows.51 Much as 
it did in the tsarist and Soviet bureaucracies, patrimonialism has dominated the post-
Soviet Russian bureaucracy as Putin’s regime has become increasingly authoritarian. His 
own meteoric rise from obscurity in St. Petersburg in 1996 to appointment as Federal 
Security Service (FSB) Director, Prime Minister, and then acting President by the 
resigning President Boris Yeltsin in 1999 illustrates the capacity of the Russian 
government’s patronage system to accommodate the rapid advancement of the well-
connected.52  
Several competing factions surround the Russian president and vie for his 
consideration and favor; among these groups are the economically market-friendly 
liberals, the politically pragmatic technocrats, and the hardline siloviki. Some compare 
the struggles for influence between the Kremlin’s factions to the “bulldog fight under the 
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carpet” description Winston Churchill devised for the infighting among the Soviet 
leadership.53 Derived from the word for Russia’s force structures, or silovye struktury, the 
siloviki include the intelligence, military, and security organs of the state. The term is 
somewhat misleading, however, as it can represent either the cohort of uniformed force 
structure officials or the clan of top officials in the Kremlin—the faction that clearly 
wields the most influence within the president’s circle.54  
As Putin himself is a product of the city of St. Petersburg and the intelligence 
apparatus, a significant number of his political appointees are acquaintances and contacts 
from his two backgrounds, including many of the siloviki.55 Ian Bremmer and Samuel 
Charap describe the siloviki clan as “an informal network of government officials and 
businessmen” who are more united by their similar interests and outlooks than by their 
backgrounds.56 Their shared interests and policy preferences include establishing a highly 
centralized state propped up by the force structures, developing a strong state that plays a 
decisive role in the economy and nationalized strategic sectors, exploiting the wealth of 
the country’s natural resources, and endorsing the nationalistic views of Russian 
Orthodoxy.57 Additionally, the siloviki seek to restore Russia’s international greatness by 
regaining the respect that the Soviet Union previously commanded, reintegrating 
economically and politically with the other former Soviet states as much as possible, and 
guarding Russia against the perceived U.S. and NATO threat that allegedly seeks to 
undermine Russia’s sovereignty and force its collapse.58 
Although the siloviki are intent on maintaining their influence and proactive in 
pursuing their collective interests, Russia’s lack of conventional power-projection 
capability limits the range of the Russian leadership’s foreign policy and security options, 
leading security scholar Pavel Baev to suggest opportunism and pragmatism as key 
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elements of Russia’s foreign policy.59 As uncompromising and influential as the siloviki 
may be, however, Bremmer recognizes Putin as the ultimate decision authority: “It’s a 
mistake to ascribe too much of the current policy to people around Putin. The policy is 
flowing from Putin himself, rather than from his advisers.”60 Putin himself lends 
credence to his decisive role. In a state television documentary marking the one-year 
anniversary of Crimea’s annexation, he recounts the all-night meeting from February 22–
23 with his security service chiefs, during which they discussed Yanukovych and the 
situation in Ukraine: “We ended at about seven in the morning. When we were parting, I 
said to my colleagues: we must start working on returning Crimea to Russia.”61 Later in 
the documentary interview he adds, “Our advantage—you know what it was? It was that 
I did this myself. It’s not that I was doing everything so correctly, but that when heads of 
state direct something, it’s easier for those working to carry it out.”62 Such is the 
authoritarianism of Putin. 
1. Rational Rationale 
A major assumption of realist thought is that state decision-makers act rationally. 
In other words, when presented with a number of alternative courses to pursue, actors 
seek to achieve the outcome that yields the greatest expected benefits according to their 
preferences.63 Such a process often involves assessing opportunities, risks, costs, and 
benefits. Fareed Zakaria explains that costs are simply the usual military and economic 
material costs while benefits are more difficult to discern: “Statesmen naturally see 
benefits in what they have done, but should include tangible benefits like bases and ports 
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and also—more warily—intangible benefits of prestige and glory.”64 Reclaiming lost 
prestige and glory is a continual objective of the Russian governing elite. 
The literature concerning the rationality of Putin’s decision-making is varied. 
Alexander Motyl writes that “no one can fully know Putin’s intentions. . . . If he is 
irrational—unable to correctly judge the costs and benefits of invading Ukraine because 
he is in thrall to some ideology or the pursuit of power—then it is safe to assume that he 
will continue his current course.”65 Although Motyl cites Lilia Shevtsova’s and Andrei 
Illarionov’s arguments that Putin fits the bill of an irrational Eurasianist who seeks 
ideological victory, he concludes that Putin is probably rational: “The occupation of 
Crimea was a grand and glorious little war that raised Putin’s popularity with hyper-
nationalists in Russia, cost no lives, and transpired quickly and relatively inexpensively. 
It might have turned Russia into a rogue state, but Putin could reasonably argue that 
‘Russian glory’ was worth that price.”66 Mearsheimer echoes this argument, calling Putin 
“a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on 
foreign policy” while rejecting German chancellor Angela Merkel’s suggestion that Putin 
is less than entirely rational when she commented that he was in “another world.”67 
Not only must rational statesmen measure costs against benefits, but they must do 
so in a realm of fluid factors heavily dependent on how other statesmen will respond. 
Walt observes that “in security studies, formal rational choice theory usually means the 
use of game theory. Game theory is a set of techniques for analyzing individual decisions, 
in situations where each player’s payoff depends in part on what the other players are 
expected to do.”68 Using a game analogy, Steven Rosefielde argues that authoritarian 
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Russian leaders like Putin are not utility optimizers but “satisficers” who “perpetually 
maneuver and gather power like masters of ‘positional chess,’ so that they can pounce 
when opportunity knocks.”69 Kimberly Marten also emphasizes Putin’s opportunism, but 
finds the analogy of judo more apt: 
U.S. and Western leaders would love to know what Putin’s ‘endgame’ is. 
The term comes from chess, where the goal is to trap one’s opponent into 
checkmate after a long series of moves requiring strategic vision. But 
Putin has never claimed to be a chessmaster; he is a judo master. Judo is 
about immediate tactics, not long-term strategy. A judoka walks into a 
room, sizes up the opponent, probes for their weaknesses, and tips the 
other off-balance in a flash—causing the opponent to fall from their own 
weight. The victor in a judo match doesn’t have to be bigger or stronger 
than the opponent, just quicker and shrewder.70 
Another competing argument is that Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine was 
neither an act of strategic calculation or pragmatic opportunism but one of dilemmatic 
desperation. Putin has been known to frame problematic issues in a way that minimizes 
the action space and often only leaves one option to pursue.71 Recalling an early 
childhood experience during an interview, Putin recounts how he learned “a quick and 
lasting lesson in the meaning of the word cornered.”72 He describes how he often chased 
rats around with sticks on the stairs of his apartment building and how one once 
responded after he drove it into a corner: “It had nowhere to run. Suddenly it lashed 
around and threw itself at me. I was surprised and frightened. Now the rat was chasing 
me. It jumped across the landing and down the stairs. Luckily, I was a little faster and I 
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managed to slam the door shut in its nose.”73 Decades after this experience, during his 
March 18, 2014, speech, Putin promulgated the narrative wherein the West had cornered 
Russia in regards to Ukraine and Crimea: “Russia found itself in a position it could not 
retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. 
You must always remember this.”74 Michael Rühle suggests that the EU’s association 
negotiations with Ukraine constituted the compressing force that threatened Putin’s 
concept for the Eurasian Economic Union: “In this sense, Putin’s decision to annex 
Crimea appeared like a decision made in desperation rather than out of a desire to enlarge 
Russian territory. Avoiding losses—and loss of face—appeared to have been more 
important than making gains.”75 The impetus to avoid losses rather than make gains 
resembles a psychological decision-making model that serves as an alternative to rational 
choice theory known as prospect theory. 
2. Prospect Theory 
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed prospect theory in 
1979 to account for deviations in empirical research wherein 60% of subjects did not 
behave according to the expected-utility theory’s assumptions and predictions of 
rationality.76 Prospect theory posits that individuals maintain reference points from which 
they evaluate gains and losses. An individual’s reference point usually reflects the status 
quo, but sometimes it can represent a non-status quo expectation.77 Most people tend to 
exhibit loss aversion, or, as Jack Levy puts it, “they overvalue losses relative to 
comparable gains, so that the pain of losses exceeds the pleasure from gains.”78 Such a 
valuation of losses and gains affects decision makers’ risk propensity or orientation: 
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individuals are more averse to risk when perceiving prospective gains but more acceptant 
of risk when perceiving prospective losses.79 
Prospect theory provides great potential for better understanding Russia’s 
rationale for its Ukrainian intervention. Putin and his siloviki seemed more risk-acceptant 
as they faced perceived losses in terms of their geopolitical and economic interests in 
Ukraine as well as prospective losses in their domestic political support. Russians viewed 
Crimea from the reference point that it still rightly belonged to Russia, as evidenced by 
Putin’s statement at the time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea that “in people’s hearts 
and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia.”80 Additionally, Putin 
and other Russian leaders often lament the loss of Russia’s prestige and status as a global 
superpower. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis focuses on the Russian government’s decision to intervene in Ukraine. 
Using contemporary and historical journal articles, speeches, interviews, and books, the 
research examines the anticipated and actual benefits and costs through the lenses of 
neoclassical realism, rational choice theory, and prospect theory. 
Based on the literature review, the main potential explanation is that Russian 
motivations consisted of a combination of gaining economic and strategic advantages, 
fulfilling national identity goals, and preventing the loss of the regime’s hold on power. 
Economic and strategic advantages for Russia include protecting its post-Soviet sphere of 
interests in Ukraine, bolstering its Eurasian Economic Union while preventing the 
expansion of the European Union, diminishing the likelihood of NATO enlargement, 
acquiring oil and natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, and obtaining exclusive rights to 
the Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol. The means of preventing the loss of the regime’s 
hold on power include advocating the Russian version of authoritarian “democracy,” 
providing a distraction from domestic discontent with the government’s failure to fulfill 
the social contract due to decreasing oil prices, and inciting fervent nationalism to bolster 
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public support and prevent a pro-democracy “color revolution” from enveloping 
Russia.81 Such efforts also served to fulfill national identity goals through boosting 
Russian ethnic nationalism, fostering irredentism, and commemorating Russian and 
Soviet victories while projecting Russian military strength. Russia’s buildup of foreign 
currency reserves facilitated Russian leaders’ projection that it could withstand 
presumable repercussive economic sanctions. Russian leaders also anticipated that the 
seemingly irrational threat of risking an economically destructive gas war with Europe 
would dampen the severity of such sanctions. They also reckoned that another seemingly 
irrational threat—Russia’s willingness to engage in nuclear war to protect its gains in 
Ukraine—would inhibit a Western military response. 
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II. RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC GAINS 
On the ruins of our superpower 
There is a major paradox of history: 
Sevastopol—the city of Russian glory— 
Is . . . outside Russian territory.82 
 —Russian Poet A. Nikolaev 
 
The existential end of the political state known as the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics has been described with several different terms: dissolution, collapse, fall, 
disintegration, implosion, death, and—for many Russians—loss. Concomitant with the 
loss of the idea of the Soviet Union was the loss of strategic possessions, including lands 
previously controlled by the tsarist Russian empire. Many Russian leaders have 
maintained that these lost possessions, including Crimea and its access to the Black Sea, 
rightfully belong to Russia.  
Putin demonstrated such thinking during his triumphant speech proclaiming 
Russia’s formal annexation of Crimea. As Putin sorrowfully recounted, “Unfortunately, 
what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart . . . It was only when 
Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not simply 
robbed, it was plundered.”83  
This chapter seeks to explain the strategic and economic benefits Russia gained, 
or regained, when seen through the lens of prospect theory from the Russian perspective, 
that resulted from the decision to invade and annex Crimea. Chief among them are three 
main strategic outcomes: obtaining exclusive and unrestricted access to its strategic Black 
Sea Fleet port in Sevastopol, gaining a trove of undeveloped but valuable natural 
resources in the Black Sea area, and putting any notion of Ukraine joining NATO or the 
European Union to rest.  
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When the Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991, many unanticipated 
questions regarding the status of personnel and the ownership of the assets of the then 
defunct Soviet military emerged. Attempts to preserve the Soviet military by creating the 
Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces gave way to the newly independent 
former Soviet republics’ insistence on having their own independent militaries.84 Much 
as a failed marital union presents unique issues of determining child custody and dividing 
property, the failed Soviet political union presented issues of determining the custody of 
the strategic and tactical nuclear forces and facilities found in Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Ukraine and dividing the naval assets of the Black Sea Fleet. Unlike a 
divorce settlement in a court mediated by a judge, however, the former Soviet states had 
no mediating authority to mete out equitable divisions of assets in the anarchical 
international system. Instead, they relied on negotiation, mutual assurances, and good 
faith.  
In the new post-Soviet era, Ukraine found itself the possessor of the world’s third 
largest arsenal of nuclear arms, after Russia and the United States. The newly 
independent state contained 45 strategic bombers, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
and roughly 1,900 nuclear warheads.85 Concerned about the emergence of additional 
nuclear-armed states, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States entered into a 
security assurance agreement with Ukraine in 1994. In what is known as the Budapest 
Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for 
respect for the “independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”86 
London, Moscow, and Washington reaffirmed “their obligation to refrain from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine” and 
“their commitment to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their 
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own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to 
secure advantages of any kind.”87 With such assurances given, Ukraine transferred all of 
its nuclear warheads to Russia by 1996.88 
While the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 helped resolve the issue of Ukraine’s 
nuclear arsenal, the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine proved 
difficult as talks dragged on for over five years in what amounted to be an international 
game of tug-of-war. Unilateral statements from both parties claiming sovereignty over 
Crimea and Sevastopol often caused negotiations to collapse.89 A major breakthrough 
occurred in May 1997, the same month the NATO–Russia Founding Act was signed, 
through the signing of the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership 
and a separate package of agreements that came to be known as the Black Sea Fleet 
Accords. The Friendship Treaty assuaged Ukrainian fears of Russia’s revanchist claims 
over Crimea by stipulating that both states “shall build their mutual relations on the basis 
of the principles of mutual respect for their sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
inviolability of borders, peaceful resolution of disputes, [and] non-use of force, including 
economic and other means of pressure.”90  
A. POST-SOVIET UKRAINE IN CONTEXT 
According to the Black Sea Fleet Accords, the two states would divide the fleet’s 
assets 50/50 but allow for Russia to buy back some of Ukraine’s apportionment, which 
eventually resulted in an 82/18 fleet asset ratio advantage for Russia.91 Additionally, the 
two parties agreed on 20 years as the length of time Ukraine would lease naval ports in 
and around Sevastopol—a compromise shorter than the Russians’ proposal for 40 years 
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but longer than the Ukrainians’ pitch for 5 to 7 years.92 The initial Ukrainian bid for the 
much shorter duration reflected Ukraine’s hopeful but somewhat naive view that the 
leasing of the Ukrainian naval facilities and infrastructure was of a transitory nature. In 
the Ukrainian view, the lease would allow Russia time to build up its own naval port 
facilities on the Black Sea at Novorossiysk and eventually remove its naval assets 
completely out of Ukraine’s territory.93 
At the heart of Russia’s concessions in the 1997 Friendship Treaty and Black Sea 
Fleet Accords was a renewed effort to strengthen ties with neighboring former Soviet 
republics amid talk of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. The day before 
these accords were signed, Russia jointly declared with NATO in the NATO–Russia 
Founding Act that they would work together “to contribute to the establishment in 
Europe of common and comprehensive security.”94 Additionally, Russia agreed to “seek 
the widest possible cooperation among participating states of the OSCE [Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] with the aim of creating in Europe a common space 
of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the 
sovereignty of any state.”95 To the opposite effect, however, Russia’s agreements with 
Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet the very next day preserved and even increased its own 
sphere of influence within Ukraine. With accords providing for a large military presence 
in Crimea for the next two decades, Russia intended to forestall Ukraine’s drift toward 
closer cooperation with NATO.96 
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1. 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Election 
In the years following the signing of the Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Fleet 
Accords, Ukraine experienced a protracted crisis of identity, which in fact continues to 
the present, as to whether its future lies toward the West or with Russia. The 2004 
presidential election illustrated the tension between these two dichotomous orientations 
through its opposing candidates: Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. 
Yushchenko, who was from the western and predominantly Ukrainian-speaking part of 
the country, offered liberal ideas of European integration among other political and 
economic reforms. Yanukovych, in contrast, was from the eastern and predominantly 
Russian-speaking part of the country, which favored closer ties with Russia.  
Although many in both the West and Russia tend to overestimate the significance 
that international politics had on Ukraine’s 2004 election, most Ukrainians voted based 
on their preferences for domestic policy issues rather than foreign policy.97 Nevertheless, 
external actors played significant roles in the eventual outcome of the election. Russia, 
for its part, threw its support behind Yanukovych and sought to achieve his election by 
applying the same strategies that had worked in achieving desired electoral outcomes in 
Russia. Moscow thus provided the Yanukovych campaign with political advisers, 
funding, and Russian media support that conveyed a pro-Yanukovych message.98 The 
capstone of Russia’s influence in its Ukrainian sphere came when Putin himself visited 
Ukraine the week before the election’s first round was held on October 31, 2004. 
Journalist Jackson Diehl fittingly captured the sentiment at the time that surrounded 
Russia’s not-so-subtle attempt to meddle in the politics of a sovereign state: 
Imagine that an imperial-minded president resolved to intervene 
aggressively in a strategic country with a fragile democracy to ensure the 
election of a favored client. To do so, he summoned his nominee and 
publicly embraced him; channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to his 
campaign; arranged for television stations broadcasting in the target 
country to openly boost the favorite and slander his opponent; opened 
hundreds of polling stations in his own country so that “expatriates” could 
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vote; and, to top it off, scheduled a trip to the foreign capital three days 
before the election to stump in person. . . . Viktor Yanukovych, prime 
minister and presidential candidate in Ukraine, has humbly welcomed all 
this and more from Russian president Vladimir Putin—and Western 
governments have responded with a studied silence.99 
Western governments did play a quiet but significant role in the outcome of the 
election by supporting election monitoring by the OSCE.100 Despite Russia’s support for 
Yanukovych, no candidate achieved the required majority to win the election in the first 
round of voting, forcing a second round that was held on November 21, 2004. Exit polls 
from the second round revealed an eight percent lead for Yushchenko, but preliminary 
results released by the Central Election Commission indicated a Yanukovych victory.101 
Putin, not expecting any outcome other than victory, phoned Yanukovych on November 
22—three days before the Central Election Commission released the official results on 
November 24—to congratulate him on his convincing victory in the “fierce but 
transparent and honest contest.”102 The OSCE International Election Observation 
Mission found otherwise, declaring on November 22 that the voting “failed to meet a 
considerable number of . . . European standards for democratic elections.”103  
2. 2004 Orange Revolution 
Spurred on by the OSCE’s condemnation of the voting process, hundreds of 
thousands of Ukrainians gathered at Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) 
the same day to protest against the fraudulent election. Termed the Orange Revolution for 
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Yushchenko’s campaign color, in which many protesters dressed, the peaceful mass 
demonstrations led Ukraine’s Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, to pass a resolution that 
invalidated the election results and led the Supreme Court to call for a repeat vote.104 
Putin, as quoted in a New York Times article, expressed his disdain for a repeat vote on 
Russian state television that was also broadcast in Ukraine: “A rerun of the second round 
may also produce nothing. What happens then? Will there have to be a third, a fourth, a 
25th round until one of the sides obtains the necessary result?”105  
Much to Putin’s chagrin, however, Yushchenko won the repeat second round of 
voting on December 26, 2004. Evidence of Putin’s long-harbored resentment for the 
West over the political loss for Yanukovych—and by extension, for Russia—surfaced 
during his Crimean annexation speech in March 2014: “In 2004, to push the necessary 
candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round 
that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution.”106  
At the time, many Ukrainians did not regard the inauguration of Yushchenko’s 
presidency in the wake of the Orange Revolution as absurd, but as a new dawn for their 
country. Instead of the drastic change that they thought “would lead them to the sunny 
uplands of liberal democracy, greater prosperity and swift integration into the Euro-
Atlantic alliances,” as Nathaniel Copsey describes, Yushchenko’s time in office was 
characterized by disappointment as it mostly proved to be more of the same type of 
governing.107 “When tectonic political shifts take place, through popular protest, the 
ballot box, by violent means—or indeed a mixture of these,” Copsey explains, 
“disappointment always follows, which of course is only to be expected when there is so 
great a weight of public expectation.”108 Yushchenko did offer a major break with 
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previous Ukrainian policy, however, in his stance toward Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in 
Crimea. 
3. Shift in Ukraine’s Stance toward Hosting Russian Black Sea Fleet 
Yushchenko viewed Ukraine’s hosting of the Russian military in Sevastopol as 
problematic for Ukraine’s security and national interests.109 The worth of the land and 
facilities in and around Sevastopol leased to Russia since 1997 for $97.75 million a year 
was estimated to be in the billions of dollars.110 This disparity factored into 
Yushchenko’s unsuccessful proposal in the spring of 2008 to allow Ukraine to settle its 
$1.3 billion gas debt to Russia and then raise the rent price.111 Ukraine was a close ally to 
Georgia, and during the latter’s military conflict with Russia in the summer of 2008, 
Yushchenko vocally opposed having the Black Sea Fleet, which was being used to 
facilitate Russia’s war efforts, based in Ukraine. Yushchenko even went so far as to 
threaten that the Russian ships might not be allowed to return to their Sevastopol port, 
although such a statement was a hollow threat given Ukraine’s military weakness and 
international treaty obligations.112 Yushchenko’s posturing may have appealed to the 
Ukrainian nationalists in western Ukraine, but it also galvanized his opposition in the 
predominantly ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking regions.  
Yushchenko’s popularity fell during his presidency. His time in office was racked 
from the onset by economic crises and gas disputes with Russia, wherein Moscow 
frequently raised prices and cut off supplies to penalize the West-leaning government.113 
He also had a political falling-out with his prime minister, Yulia Timoshenko, who 
played a role in the Orange Revolution. She later tempered her anti-Russian rhetoric and 
adopted a more Russian-friendly approach, forging a pragmatic relationship with 
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Russia’s then prime minister, Vladimir Putin, to resolve some of the gas disputes.114 
When Yushchenko ran for re-election in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election, he 
mustered only 5.4% of the vote in the first round compared with 24.8% for Timoshenko 
and 35.5% for Yanukovych.115  
4. Russia’s Preferred Man Elected and Russian Black Sea Fleet Lease 
Extended 
Yanukovych went on to win the second round on February 7, 2010. Unlike in 
2004, the 2010 election was devoid of Russian interference and determined to have been 
conducted under democratically sound procedures by the OSCE. Alexander Rahr, the 
program director of the Center for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the German Council 
on Foreign Relations suggested in a Guardian interview in 2010 that Russia did not 
“want to be in a situation like 2004, where they put all their eggs in one basket and lost 
Ukraine for some years.”116 Although Yanukovych had supported Ukraine’s efforts to 
join the EU to appease the interests of Ukraine’s oligarchs, his election effectively 
derailed Yushchenko’s plans and efforts to obtain Ukraine’s entry into NATO.117 
Yanukovych’s victory was hence viewed in Russia as a victory over the West and a 
vindication for Putin’s support for him in 2004.118 During a meeting with President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Prime Minister Putin displayed his democratically 
correct diplomatic skills, refined since 2004, when he commented, “I think today we can 
congratulate . . . Yanukovych on his presidential election victory. Today it was officially 
announced by the Central Election Commission. Let’s call and congratulate him.”119 
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Within two months of his inauguration as Ukraine’s fourth president, 
Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv agreement that extended Russia’s lease on its naval base 
in Sevastopol for another 25 years in return for a 30% discount on gas imports worth up 
to $40 billion.120 Instead of expiring in 2017, the renewed lease would provide Russia’s 
Black Sea Fleet with a home in Crimea until 2042. Journalist Luke Harding in April 2010 
described the lease extension as “the most concrete sign yet that Ukraine is now back 
under Russia’s influence following Yanukovych’s victory in February’s presidential 
elections. It appears to mark the final nail in the coffin of the Orange Revolution of 
2004.”121 
B. GAINING UNFETTERED ACCESS TO SEVASTOPOL BLACK SEA 
FLEET PORT 
When Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in early 2014, the status of the Black 
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for the next three decades was never really in jeopardy, thanks to 
Yanukovych’s lease extension. Nonetheless, the transfer of Ukrainian power from pro-
Russian Yanukovych to a then unknown but certain-to-be pro-Western type of 
government represented a stinging loss for Putin, who had personally gone to great 
lengths to install and maintain a Ukrainian leader compliant with Russian interests. In 
such a context, Putin perceived the end of Yanukovych’s pro-Russian regime in Kiev in 
zero-sum terms, and his overvaluing of this loss contributed to the risk-acceptant decision 
to intervene in Crimea. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea secured several significant strategic military 
benefits for Russia. First and foremost, it put the uncertainty about the future status of 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol to rest, indefinitely. The action also relieved 
Russia of the obligation of having to pay rent, either in monetary or gas-discount form, to 
Ukraine for the use of the base for the length of the lease—a savings of over $39 billion 
to say nothing of rent beyond the term of the lease. 
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In addition to affording Russia exclusive ownership of one of the Black Sea’s best 
naval bases due in part to Sevastopol’s extensive infrastructure and natural harbor, 
Crimea’s annexation released Russia from treaty restrictions and requirements.122 Before 
annexation, the type and number of Russian ships in Sevastopol were subject to 
Ukrainian consent, thus hampering Russia’s plans to modernize its Black Sea Fleet.123 
Subject to such limitations, Russia planned to upgrade the port infrastructure at its other 
major Black Sea Fleet naval base in Novorossiysk, which included adding 15 piers to 
accommodate 30 ships at a cost of $1 billion.124 Unlike the port in Sevastopol, the naval 
port in Novorossiysk’s Tsemes Bay is prone to 70 to 90 mile-per-hour bora, or 
northeasterly, winds that occur 30 to 40 days a year, mostly during the cold season from 
September to March.125 During encounters with the bora winds, which are capable of 
inflicting catastrophic damage to ships and buildings, ships are forced to sail away from 
the harbor to prevent damage and avoid accidents.126 Such inhospitable natural 
conditions necessitated complex and costly Russian engineering plans to construct high-
tech barriers as part of building up Novorossiysk’s naval infrastructure.127 By annexing 
Crimea, Russia became free to not only upgrade its aging Sevastopol fleet with newer 
ships but also to add ships in accordance with its Black Sea Fleet modernization plans, 
thereby reducing the necessity of following through with its costly plans to build up the 
naval base in Novorossiysk. 
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The strategic military benefits gained by Russia can be explained in realist terms. 
Offensive realists might keenly point out that Russia, by annexing Crimea, obtained 
freedom of action in the peninsula. Subsequently, the Russian navy, as it modernizes and 
adds to its fleet based in Sevastopol, can freely increase its power projection capability 
beyond the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.128 Also, a 
Russian Crimea strengthens Moscow’s military influence over Kiev. By acquiring a third 
front in the south, in addition to its northeastern and southeastern fronts, Russia poses a 
greater threat to Ukraine with future conventional seapower, airpower, landpower, and 
hybrid warfare.129 
Defensive realists might note that Russia’s newfound freedom of action in Crimea 
allows for the deployment of nuclear arms to the peninsula and for the enhancement of its 
air defense capabilities.130 Russia’s annexation of Crimea also precludes the possibility 
of NATO sailors in Sevastopol. In his March 18, 2014 speech, Putin mentioned that 
Russia was “against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our 
backyard or in our historic territory” and that he could not “imagine that we would travel 
to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors.” Providing a moment of levity, he continued, “Of 
course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and 
visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round.”131 He was perhaps referencing 
the September 1, 2008, instance when the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, after 
delivering humanitarian aid supplies to Georgia in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war a 
few weeks earlier, anchored in Sevastopol to conduct joint theater security training with 
the Ukrainian Navy.132 A crowd of thousands of Russian anti-NATO protesters chanting 
“Yankees, go home!” prompted the crew’s refusal to disembark into the same port city 
that moored several Russian ships used in combat operations conducted against 
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Georgia.133 Such a visit now by a U.S. ship to Sevastopol truly is unimaginable in the 
wake of Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea. 
C. ACQUIRING BLACK SEA OIL AND GAS ASSETS 
The incorporation of Sevastopol and the Crimean peninsula into the Russian 
Federation has garnered much attention in the aftermath of the Russian intervention. 
Much less attention has been given to one of the major economic inducements benefitting 
Russia—a major portion of the Black Sea itself and its trove of undeveloped natural 
resources. Of the approximately 36,000 square miles of Crimean territorial waters in the 
Black Sea acquired by Russia (see Figure 1), the Ukrainian government estimates there 
are 2.3 million tons of oil reserves worth $300 billion buried beneath the seabed, whereas 
other estimates put the potential value in the trillions.134 European petroleum experts and 
analysts predicted in 2013 that exploration projects in Ukraine’s Black Sea waters, which 
had “tremendous exploration potential,” might produce “a game-changing shift for 
Ukraine, whose energy inefficient economy is being squeezed by high fuel import 
prices.”135 In May 2014, Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, denied any connection 
between the energy resources that previously belonged to Ukraine and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. He claimed that “compared to all the potential Russia has, there 
was no interest there.”136 Russian actions showed otherwise. 
                                                 
133 “U.S. Warship Met by Anti-NATO Protests in Ukraine’s Sevastopol,” RIA Novosti, September 1, 
2008, http://sputniknews.com/world/20080901/116450879.html. 
134 John Biersack and Shannon O’Lear, “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: 
Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, no. 3 (2014): 258. 
doi:10.1080/15387216.2014.991340; William J. Broad, “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel 
Reserves,” New York Times, May 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-
crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html. 
135 Ken White, “The Black Sea Hots Up,” Geo ExPro 10, no. 1 (2013): 29, http://assets.geoexpro.com/
uploads/5c04c64c-caed-4d19-881b-711e3b7ca8ea/GEO_ExPro_v10i1_Full.pdf. 26–31 
136 Broad, “Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves.” 
 34
Figure 1.  Russian Black Sea Accessions from the Annexation of Crimea 
 
Source: John Biersack and Shannon O’Lear, “The Geopolitics of Russia’s Annexation of 
Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 
55, no. 3 (2014): 258. doi:10.1080/15387216.2014.991340. 
Immediately after the Russian intervention began, Crimean authorities seized and 
nationalized Chornomornaftogaz, Ukraine’s Black Sea energy development company 
whose name literally means “Black Sea Oil and Gas,” and its assets; following Crimea’s 
annexation into Russia, Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, incorporated 
Chornomornaftogaz.137 In the years leading up to the intervention, Russia exerted 
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immense economic pressure on Ukraine through its gas and oil supply and pricing. 
Eurasian security studies expert Carol Saivetz emphasizes the significance of Russia’s 
Crimean annexation, stating that it “deprives Ukraine [of] the possibility of developing 
these resources and gives them to Russia” and “makes Ukraine more vulnerable to 
Russian pressure.”138 Instead of the Black Sea energy resources being a game-changer 
for Ukraine, Russia’s seizure of them severely tightened the vice on Ukraine’s 
dependence on energy imported from Russia and augmented Russia’s own economic 
interests. Much as Thucydides described the relations between the strong and the weak, 
in terms of energy security, Russia certainly did what it could while Ukraine suffered 
what it must in the zero-sum but high-stakes game for state economic lifeblood—oil and 
gas.139 
D. MINIMIZING THE PROSPECT OF UKRAINE JOINING NATO 
Beyond the strategic military and economic benefits gained by Putin’s decision to 
“return Crimea,” the action also furthered Moscow’s interest in reducing any prospect of 
NATO membership extension to Ukraine. NATO governments had stated in the April 3, 
2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that they welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO 
membership aspirations and that they “agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO.”140 The actual prospects for both nations to join NATO were low, 
however, due to the reluctance of several NATO member states that viewed their 
accession as antagonistic toward Russia.141  
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Russia’s actions during the Russo-Georgian war in early August 2008—four 
months after the statement affirming that Georgia would become a member of NATO—
served to reinforce the misgivings of some NATO member states. Several allies were 
reluctant to take on and provide collective defense for a prospective member state with 
significant unresolved security issues. Russia’s freezing of the South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian conflicts in Georgia has perpetuated the security uncertainty and state of 
political limbo not just for those regions, but for Georgia as a whole. Russia’s 2014 
intervention in Ukraine has had a similar effect in diminishing, if not eliminating, what 
little prospect existed for Ukraine to join NATO. On June 5, 2014 American scholar and 
former diplomat Steven Pifer told the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “not 
pursuing a deeper relationship with NATO now seems an appropriate policy for Ukraine: 
deepening relations with NATO would antagonize Moscow, and there is no appetite in 
the Alliance to accept Ukraine as a member or offer a membership action plan.”142 
Unlike its freezing of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, Russia does not 
seem intent on freezing the conflict in eastern Ukraine. 
While the situation in the Donbas is still unfolding, it seems that the Russian 
objectives in the area have changed since the onset of the conflict. Russia’s initial covert 
support for the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, mainly in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions, aimed to establish a widespread movement against Kiev’s new 
trajectory toward the West.143 Lawrence Freedman explains the range of Russia’s initial 
motives: “At a minimum, this could put irresistible pressure on the post-Maidan 
Ukrainian government to back away from its pro-Western course; at a maximum, it could 
help reconstruct the old territory of Novorossiya, which might then attach itself in some 
way to Russia.”144 Two ceasefire agreements later, it appears that Moscow for now has 
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postponed the effort to reconstruct the historic Russian concept of Novorossiya in eastern 
Ukraine.145  
In the most recent ceasefire agreement—Minsk II—signed in February 2015, the 
separatist leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics no longer demanded 
independence from Ukraine but sought significant autonomy within Ukraine. Freedman 
credits the Minsk II agreement for elucidating Russia’s true objectives in the region: 
“getting Kiev to pick up the bill for social spending and economic survival for these 
territories, while allowing them to integrate back into Ukraine with a special, autonomous 
status and a veto on Kiev’s membership of the EU or NATO.”146 In a June 2015 
interview with an Italian newspaper correspondent, Putin admitted to Russia’s use of 
force in eastern Ukraine but attributed this to a noble but highly suspect objective: “All 
our actions, including those with the use of force, were aimed not at tearing away this 
territory from Ukraine but at giving the people living there an opportunity to express their 
opinion on how they want to live their lives.”147 This self-determination assertion is 
merely a recycled argument that Russia had previously used to justify its interventions in 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea. 
Although much in the world has changed since the final scene of the grand 74-
year Soviet experiment in 1991, several things within the minds of the Russian leadership 
elite have not. Among these is their reference point consensus that Crimea, Sevastopol, 
and a major portion of the Black Sea and its resources rightfully belong to Russia. This 
reference point, frozen in place as it has been since the end of the Cold War, also holds 
that Ukraine is an extension of Russia proper, to be influenced and controlled by Russia’s 
leaders. In their view, Ukraine can never be allowed to be party to a military alliance or 
other organization perceived as hostile to Russian interests. Perhaps this frozen reference 
point is why in 1994, as quoted in a New York Times article, Russian president Boris 
Yeltsin referred to the possible expansion of the then 16-member NATO as plunging 
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Europe into a “cold peace.”148 The cold peace that describes the current state of relations 
between the leaders of Russia and the leaders of the United States and the 27 other 
member states of NATO has been kept frosty by the Russian leadership’s reference point, 
which has remained frozen in time since the end of the Soviet Union. 
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III. SETTING THE STAGE FOR UKRAINE: U.S. AND RUSSIAN 
RELATIONS 
The coming years will be decisive . . . for the entire world as it enters a 
period of transition and possibly even shocks.149 
 —Vladimir Putin 
 
When “little green men” invaded Crimea in February 2014 and took over its key 
government and military facilities, the action shocked many in the West. The leaders of 
EU and NATO member states, including U.S. president Barack Obama, until then had 
wholeheartedly subscribed to the notion of an enduring peace and security order in 
Europe. With the end of the Cold War, they viewed Europe as finally free from the 
incessant power politics and wars that had ravaged the continent for centuries. History 
had consigned the Marxist ideology in Europe to its dustbin. Many in Europe saw the end 
of the Cold War as the ushering in of a widespread peace and prosperity rooted in 
democratic-, rule-of-law-, and market economy-based liberal values.  
Shocking to this liberal mindset were Russia’s brazen annexation of a sovereign 
European state’s territory and the rearranging of borders in Europe on March 18, 2014. 
Led by President Vladimir Putin, Russia was partly motivated to invade Crimea by a 
desire to assert itself as an independent actor on the world stage while securing its 
national interests. The Russians asserted that they were acting much like the United 
States had done around the world.  
Putin’s decision to intervene in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was influenced by 
two major factors, among others: the failure of President Obama and his administration to 
accurately assess the mindset and intentions of Putin and his regime and, conversely, 
Putin’s accurate assessment of the propensity of Western leaders to not respond militarily 
to risk-laden conflicts. This chapter explores, to begin with, the political context of 
Obama’s and Putin’s understanding of each other from their first meeting in the wake of 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. It also examines the attempted “reset” in U.S.-Russian 
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relations based on the Obama administration’s perceptions of Russia, the impact of 
Putin’s pre-presidential background in his dealings with foreign leaders, and both leaders’ 
positions on the Syrian crisis with regard to chemical weapons. Finally, this chapter 
discusses how this context contributed to Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine and 
annex Crimea. 
A. ROSE-COLORED GLASSES: THE BELIEF THAT THE PAST HAS NO 
PLACE IN THE PRESENT 
Eight days after Putin gave his speech in Moscow on March 18, 2014, marking 
the official incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation, Obama 
spoke in Brussels to leaders and representatives of the EU and NATO. Recounting the 
tumultuous and war-filled history of Europe, he contrasted the Western vision for Europe 
with a rival vision that seemed to have resurfaced from the time when an Iron Curtain had 
divided the continent: 
The people of Europe . . . are more secure and more prosperous because 
we stood together for the ideals we shared. . . . Once again, we are 
confronted with the belief among some that bigger nations can bully 
smaller ones to get their way—that recycled maxim that might somehow 
makes right. . . . Russia’s leadership is challenging truths that only a few 
weeks ago seemed self-evident, that in the 21st century the borders of 
Europe cannot be redrawn with force, that international law matters, that 
people and nations can make their own decisions about their future.150 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine shattered Obama’s ideal of an emerging liberal peace 
based on shared values and cooperation in Europe. Russia’s actions also revealed the 
extent to which Obama had misunderstood Putin. A mere 17 months earlier, Obama 
found himself as the presidential incumbent competing for reelection against the 
Republican nominee, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. In the midst of the 
campaigning, on March 26, 2012, Obama met with Russian president Dmitri Medvedev 
at a conference in South Korea. Unbeknownst to Obama, his microphone recorded an 
exchange with Medvedev in which he asked Medvedev to relay to Putin that he needed 
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more negotiating space on missile defense because the American election was coming up 
in November: “This is my last election. After my election, I have more flexibility.”151 
The same day, Mitt Romney discussed Obama’s “hot mike” comment with CNN anchor 
Wolf Blitzer: “If he’s [Obama’s] planning on doing more and suggests to Russia that—
that he has things he’s willing to do with them, he’s not telling to the American people—
this is to Russia, this is, without question, our number one geopolitical foe.”152 Nine 
months later during the October 22, 2012, televised debate between the two, Obama 
misquoted and ridiculed Romney for naming Russia as America’s biggest geopolitical 
threat: “You said Russia, in the 1980s, they’re now calling to ask for their foreign policy 
back because, you know, the Cold War’s been over for 20 years.”153 Romney responded 
by clarifying that he had said that Russia represented a geopolitical foe: “Russia does 
continue to battle us in the UN time and time again. I have clear eyes on this. I’m not 
going to wear rose-colored glasses when it comes to Russia, or Mr. Putin.”154 
1. 2008 Russo-Georgian War 
Based on his debate statements in 2012, Obama may have forgotten the 
circumstances involving Russia that surfaced during his first presidential election 
campaign in 2008. On August 8, 2008, then-Senator and Democratic Party presidential 
nominee Obama was vacationing in Hawaii when Russia invaded its Georgian neighbor. 
Three days later, Obama made a statement calling on Russia to cease its aggression and 
for the United States “to continue to push for a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling 
for an immediate end to the violence,” disregarding Russia’s status as a permanent 
member of the council with veto power.155 Later in his statement, Obama mentioned how 
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Russia’s actions in Georgia went against the ideal of the Olympics then being held in 
China: “The violence taking place along the Black Sea is just miles from Sochi, the site 
for the Winter Olympics in 2014. It only adds to the tragedy and outrage of the current 
situation that Russia has acted while the world has come together in peace and athletic 
competition in Beijing.”156 In a twist of irony, Obama would again mention the Sochi 
Winter Olympics while expressing concern about Russia’s actions in another neighboring 
country—Ukraine—as a second-term president in 2014: “Any violation of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity would be deeply destabilizing . . . And just days after 
the world came to Russia for the Olympic Games, it would invite the condemnation of 
nations around the world.”157 For Obama, Russia’s actions in Crimea removed the rose-
colored glasses through which he had viewed Putin. 
At the time of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Dmitry Medvedev 
was the president of Russia, having entered office only a few months earlier in May. 
Putin, who had already served two presidential terms, was forbidden by the Russian 
constitution from serving an additional consecutive term and was instead serving as 
Russia’s prime minister. This political arrangement came to be known as the tandem of 
Russian power sharing, although many—including Obama—correctly accredited the real 
mantle of power and authority of action to Prime Minister Putin.158 Obama, having won 
the 2008 election, focused on “resetting” the deteriorating U.S.-Russian relationship after 
taking office in January 2009. In April 2009, Obama met with Medvedev in London, and 
in July he met with Putin for the first time while in Moscow. 
2. Pressing the Overburden Button 
If anything, the “reset” in relations got off to a shaky start. In March 2009, Obama 
had dispatched his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to literally press the reset button on 
relations with Russia. In Geneva, Clinton presented a red button with Russian and 
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English labels to Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. After the two pressed the 
button together, Lavrov looked at it and told Clinton, “You got it wrong.” The red 
button—instead of being labelled perezagruzka, the Russian word for reset—had the 
Russian word peregruzka, which means overcharge, overload, or overburden. The two 
laughed it off while Clinton promised, “We won’t let you do that to us.”159 Despite the 
well-intentioned gesture, the button itself would come to symbolize the difficulty in 
accurately understanding the other—an essential requisite for truly resetting relations.  
Notwithstanding the diplomatic faux pas, Obama was hopeful that progress could 
be made with President Medvedev, as was evident in a joint statement offered in April 
2009 that they were “ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start 
in relations.”160 The week before meeting with Putin in July 2009, however, Obama 
charted a rocky start when he told a newspaper interviewer that Putin had “one foot in the 
old ways of doing business and one foot in the new.”161 He also emphasized the 
importance for Putin to “understand that the old Cold War approaches to U.S.-Russian 
relations is [sic] outdated—that it’s time to move forward in a different direction.”162 In 
effect, he was saying that Putin needed to understand the importance of moving past Cold 
War thinking—the same thing for which he would later chide Romney in the 2012 
debate. Never one to be outdone, Putin responded to Obama’s criticism: “We are 
standing firmly on both feet and always look to the future. That is the peculiarity of 
Russia. That has always allowed Russia to move forward and get stronger. That will 
continue.”163 As it turned out, both the United States and Russia would maintain their 
future footings with regard to a list of issues that pitted each state’s interests against its 
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competitor’s. Matters regarding Syria, Iran, ballistic missile defense, nuclear arms 
treaties, and Edward Snowden would impede Obama’s hoped-for reset, and the Ukraine 
crisis would culminate its failure.164 
3. First Meetings, Impressions, and Assessments 
With back and forth statements between the relatively inexperienced American 
president and the seasoned Russian prime minister the week before their first encounter, 
the political atmosphere was quite charged when Obama later met with Putin for a two-
hour breakfast. At the start of the meeting, Putin expressed hope for positive relations 
after recalling the history between the two states with its “very many different occasions 
and events of different, shall we say, color. There were periods when our relations 
flourished quite a bit and there were periods of, shall we say, grayish mood between our 
two countries and of stagnation.”165 Both leaders used the opportunity to explain their 
views and assess the other in person. After the meeting, Obama offered his appraisement 
of Putin: “I found him to be tough, smart, shrewd, very unsentimental, very pragmatic. 
And on areas where we disagree, like Georgia, I don’t anticipate a meeting of the minds 
anytime soon.”166 According to a senior U.S. official, the meeting improved Obama’s 
assessment of Putin—he was “very convinced the prime minister is a man of today and 
he’s got his eyes firmly on the future.”167 Obama was not the first U.S. president to 
experience a positive change in his assessment of Putin after meeting with him for the 
first time.  
In June 2001, President George W. Bush first met Putin in Slovenia during 
discussions on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Afterwards, Bush famously 
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related how he got a sense of Putin’s soul when he looked into his eyes.168 Bush’s vice 
president, Dick Cheney, described the encounter and its effects in his memoir:  
The president was criticized for the remark, but I think it reflected the 
hopes of the time that Putin would be a different kind of Russian leader, 
one who would put his nation on a path to greater freedom. I must say I 
was never too optimistic about Putin. When I looked into his eyes, I saw 
an old KGB hand. I didn’t trust him and still don’t, but then I’m not given 
to trusting Russian or Soviet leaders.169 
According to former Vice President Cheney, the West had moved past the 
divisions of the Cold War, but Putin still longed for them and sought to “turn back the 
clock and do whatever possible to restore Russian power and influence.”170 Obama’s vice 
president, Joe Biden, mostly agreed with Cheney’s view in an interview he gave after 
returning from a trip to Ukraine and Georgia a few weeks after Obama’s trip to Moscow 
in July 2009. He offered a candid and accurate evaluation of the political conditions in 
Russia: “They’re in a situation where the world is changing before them and they’re 
clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable.”171 Both Biden and Cheney were 
correct in their conclusions, as was Obama in his initial 2009 statements before meeting 
Putin and attempting the reset—that Putin’s outlook was and remains an issue of domain. 
In prospect theory, domain describes the realm in which decisions are made and whether 
that realm is perceived by an actor as characterized by gains or losses.172 Ever since 
coming to power in December 1999, Putin has perceived his domain as a realm of 
losses—Russia’s loss of empire, prestige, lands, power, possessions, status, identity, and 
even citizens. Vice President Biden highlighted Russia’s difficulty in dealing with the 
loss of its empire, its shrinking population, and its withering economy. He asserted that 
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the deteriorating conditions in Russia contributed to a significant shift in Moscow’s 
thinking about its international interests—a shift that, Biden believed, made Putin and his 
associates more likely to cooperate with the Obama administration.173 
4. A False Image 
Although many points of his assessment of Russia’s conditions were accurate, 
Biden’s—and by extension, Obama’s—overarching conclusion that Moscow would be 
more inclined to cooperate with Washington because the Russians perceived the interests 
of both as converging, or, in other words, that the reset would work, proved to be way off 
the mark. Until “little green men”—Russian military personnel without insignia—
appeared in Crimea, Obama and his administration had been caught in the cognitive trap 
of mirror imaging, or as Zachary Shore describes, assuming “consciously or 
unconsciously, that the other side will think and act like us.”174 Russia’s 21st century 
aggression against Ukraine and flagrant redrawing of borders in defiance of international 
agreements and law shattered the image of a new liberal era of peace and prosperity in 
Europe—an idea that Obama had projected as desired by all European leaders, including 
Putin. 
In 1960, a former State Department planner, Louis Halle, warned against the 
natural tendency for policymakers to craft a state’s foreign policy after their minds’ 
preferred image of the external world rather than the world’s actuality.175 “In the degree 
that the image is false, actually and philosophically false,” he wrote, “no technicians, 
however proficient, can make the policy that is based on it sound.”176 Obama’s hopeful 
but somewhat naive image of the world—one of a time where, as he stated, “in 2009, a 
great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries” and 
“the days when empires could treat sovereign states as pieces on a chessboard are 
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over”—was proved false by Russia in 2014 in Ukraine.177 In July 2009 Vice President 
Biden, while discussing the weaknesses of Russia, commented, “I think we vastly 
underestimate the hand that we hold.”178 Instead of vastly underestimating its hand in 
2009, the Obama administration failed to comprehend Putin’s mindset and motivations. 
As Shore suggests, “It takes a good deal of empathy to break the mirror of mirror 
imaging and sense what others are thinking and feeling. And it takes an imaginative leap 
to envision how a stranger’s circumstances might affect his actions.”179 It takes an 
inordinate amount of empathy and a colossal imaginative leap for an American politician 
to understand the thinking of a former KGB operative like Putin. 
B. THE IMPACT OF PUTIN’S BACKGROUND 
Much like Cheney, the Brookings Institution’s Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy 
view Putin’s background working for the KGB as pivotal in guiding his decisions and 
actions as the leader of Russia. In their co-authored book Mr. Putin: Operative in the 
Kremlin, however, they go further in ascribing Putin’s modus operandi to the sum of his 
distinct life experiences. “Putin’s outlook,” they write, “has been shaped by many 
influences: a combination of the Soviet and Russian contexts in which he grew up, lived, 
and worked.”180 Putin’s formative periods are varied and many. He grew up in a rough 
part of the city then called Leningrad. He trained for the KGB and served as a KGB 
operative in Dresden, East Germany, while secluded from the wholesale societal changes 
of Gorbachev’s reforms. He worked for the mayor of St. Petersburg as the “fix-it” man in 
the chaotic early 1990s. Finally, he went to Moscow in 1996 at the beginning of his 
meteoric rise that would make him Russia’s acting president on the last day of 1999. The 
identities that he formed from each experience shaped Putin into the actor he is today. 
Hill and Gaddy explain that the six identities of Putin that they analyze—the Statist, the 
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History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the Case Officer—are 
not sequential but parallel: “They blend into each other and are not mutually 
exclusive.”181 Of the six, Putin’s identity as a case officer, or an operative, is perhaps the 
most important in understanding Putin the President. 
In 2000, a Kremlin-commissioned biographical work titled First Person: 
Conversations with Vladimir Putin, which was based largely on personal interviews with 
Putin and his close associates, sought to provide the Russian public with a sense of who 
their new president was. In one of the book’s interviews, Sergei Roldugin, a close and 
long-time friend of Putin, offered some intriguing insight into how Putin sees himself. 
Roldugin recounted how Putin had years earlier told him that he worked for the KGB but 
did not give any details about what he did. Curious, Roldugin decided to press the issue 
and question Putin directly: 
I asked him later, “I am a cellist—I play the cello. I could never be a 
surgeon. But I am a good cellist. And what is your profession? I know you 
are an intelligence agent. But I don’t know what that means. Who are you? 
What can you do?” And he told me, “I am a specialist in communicating 
with people.” With that we ended the conversation. And he really thought 
that he professionally deals with [or handles] people.182  
Hill and Gaddy describe the Russian phrase that Putin used—spetsialist po 
obshcheniyu s lyu’dmi, which means a specialist in communicating or working with 
people—as an essential skill for a KGB operative. “For the intelligence officer,” they 
explain, “the most important function of ‘working with people’ is to study the psychology 
of one’s counterparts. For the case officer, this is also a necessary step in recruiting and 
running an individual agent. It means studying the minds of the targets, finding their 
vulnerabilities, and figuring out how to use them.”183 Although he left KGB service in 
1990, Putin retained his ability to analyze his targets in order to find and exploit their 
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vulnerabilities—an aptitude that he even employs while dealing with other heads of state 
and government, including President Obama. 
In contrast with Obama’s openness in sharing his assessment of Putin, Putin has 
refrained from providing details about how he views Obama. Such silence on Putin’s part 
is not by happenstance, however. As Putin indicated during a press conference after the 
appearance of uniformed but unidentified troops in Crimea, he understands the 
importance of reticence and disguising one’s thoughts when occasion requires. When a 
reporter asked Putin about the possible repercussions of Russian military action in 
Ukraine as a violation of the Budapest Memorandum assurances, Putin responded: 
“Before making public statements, and all the more so before taking practical steps, we 
give due thought and attention and try to foresee the consequences and reactions that the 
various potential players could have.”184 He tactically diverted the discussion to 
questions about the constitutionality and ambiguity of Ukraine’s Euromaidan movement. 
In so doing, he posed his own question to the reporter, whose response prompted a 
glimpse into Putin’s often-concealed inner thinking. “You should join the diplomatic 
service; you’d make a good diplomat,” Putin told him. “Diplomats’ tongues, as we know, 
are there to hide their thoughts.”185 Putin the Diplomat not only knows how to hide his 
thoughts but also his ambitions. 
One reason why Putin rose so rapidly from obscurity to the pinnacle of Russia’s 
federal government is his ability to shape people’s perception of him—he gets his 
intended audience to see him how they want him to be instead of what he really is.186 
Putin is also an opportunist with sharp eyes for circumstances that he can exploit to 
achieve his ends.187 During his rapid ascent to the Russian presidency, as Hill and Gaddy 
note, Putin carefully observed those who might advance his career: “He studied them, 
strengthened his personal and professional ties to them, did favors for them, and 
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manipulated them. He allowed—even actively encouraged—people to underestimate him 
as he maneuvered himself into influential positions and quietly accumulated power.”188 
As the Russian leader, Putin operates in the same fashion with other state leaders. 
C. A RED LINE IN SYRIA 
The turbulent Syrian political landscape in the midst of the Arab spring and 
Obama’s reactions to it granted Putin an opportunity to capitalize on Obama’s perceived 
weakness to score political points as an international arbiter. After Syria’s president, 
Bashar al-Assad, responded to anti-government protests with draconian measures in April 
2011, the United States and many other Western nations condemned Assad’s regime. In 
the following months, Washington and the EU applied several rounds of sanctions. 
Similar efforts at the United Nations were not unanimous, however, as Russia and China 
both vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have imposed sanctions on 
Syria. In August 2011 Obama called for Assad’s resignation, and in February 2012, due 
to the deterioration of stability within the country, Washington withdrew its ambassador 
to Syria and closed its embassy in Damascus.189 
A debate developed among Obama’s national security team concerning how to 
further respond to the situation. Earlier in 2011, the United States and some NATO allies 
and partners used military force to remove another Middle Eastern dictator, Muammar al-
Qaddafi, in Libya. They did so by supporting Libyan rebels with an extended aerial 
bombardment campaign against Qaddafi’s forces. In October 2011, the rebels found and 
executed Qaddafi. As then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta writes in his memoir, the 
situation in Syria was quite different from that in Libya: “Assad was much more heavily 
armed, the country was far less accessible, and among the military’s munitions were large 
storehouses of chemical weapons and modern air defense systems, the latter supplied by 
the Soviet Union and later Russia.”190 After surveying a range of options, Obama chose 
to pursue a course of action that did not include lethal military intervention but did 
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include providing training for moderate Syrian rebels. One of the factors that particularly 
concerned Obama was the cache of chemical weapons in Syria. As the fighting 
intensified and the casualties mounted, Obama emphasized where he stood on the issue 
on August 20, 2012: “We have communicated in no uncertain terms . . . that there would 
be enormous consequences if we start seeing . . . the use of chemical weapons. That 
would change my calculations significantly.”191 Obama thus drew a red line for Assad. 
Assad would soon test Obama’s resolve to back his words. 
One year and one day after Obama’s warning against Assad’s use of chemical 
weapons, Assad’s regime used chemical weapons against its own people. According to a 
U.S. government assessment, the chemical weapons attack on August 21, 2013, by the 
Syrian government resulted in the deaths of 1,429 people, 426 of whom were children.192 
Obama and John Kerry, who had replaced Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, initially 
opted for a limited military response, but as Panetta recounts, Obama vacillated between 
response options and ultimately retreated by sending the decision to Congress—a move 
that was “an almost certain way to scotch any action.”193 Obama had painted himself into 
a corner. For his ostensible display of weakness, Obama took a lot of criticism not only 
from his political opponents but also from within his own administration. Panetta 
describes the impact: 
The result, I felt, was a blow to American credibility. When the president 
as commander in chief draws a red line, it is critical that he act if the line 
is crossed. The power of the United States rests on its word, and clear 
signals are important both to deter adventurism and to reassure allies that 
we can be counted on. Assad’s action clearly defied President Obama’s 
warning; by failing to respond, it sent the wrong message to the world.194 
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Although Obama’s dithering and inaction over Syria may have sent the wrong 
message to the world, it certainly sent a clear message to Russia. A receptive Putin 
understood that under Obama’s leadership, the United States would not always act to 
deter or punish adventurism. Furthermore, Obama’s self-created dilemma opened a 
window for Putin to interpose whereby he could benefit in two ways: gain political clout 
in helping Obama save face and prevent American military action against the regime of 
his longtime ally Assad. Putin’s role as a staunch patron of Assad developed from the 
special relationship between Moscow and Damascus that dates back decades to the Cold 
War era. In addition to maintaining a naval base at Tartus in Syria and serving as the 
Syrian government’s top arms supplier, Russia had propped up Assad’s regime since the 
beginning of Syria’s civil war—one of several obstacles that stood in the way of a true 
reset in relations between Russia and the United States.  
In this context, Putin’s political rescue of Obama, wherein he offered a plan to 
transfer possession of Syria’s chemical weapons to the international community, came as 
a surprise. At the time, Guardian journalist Simon Tisdall described how “the White 
House, not Assad, was disarmed—it simply did not see it coming,” and yet Obama 
seemed to accept Putin’s plan “with almost embarrassing eagerness.”195 Throughout his 
post-KGB career, Putin did many favors, both big and small, for acquaintances and even 
strangers. He once described his rationale for providing the favors to a political figure, 
whom he helped escape from a scandal, with a response reminiscent of the moral from 
Aesop’s tale of the lion and the mouse that “a kindness is never wasted.”196 Putin told 
him, “You never know who people might turn out to be.”197 Putin’s throwing a lifeline to 
Obama in Syria also fits well with Hill’s and Gaddy’s argument that “Putin wants to have 
various means of making people feel beholden to him.”198 Not only did Putin’s plan 
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make Obama feel beholden to him, but it seemed to reverse the traditional roles, at least 
temporarily, of idealist Obama and realist Putin with Putin taking the idealistic high road. 
D. DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO 
In the ultimate game of international one-upmanship, Putin bested his American 
counterpart with regard to Obama’s red line on Syria’s use of chemical weapons by 
preventing the use of force and opting instead for a peaceful means of resolution. For his 
efforts, Putin was later nominated for the Nobel Peace prize—the same prize that Obama 
won in 2009 after assuming the presidency. The New York Times quoted Iosif Kobzon, a 
member of the Russian Duma, who contrasted the two leaders’ merits for the award:  
Barack Obama has the title of Nobel Prize winner—the man who initiated 
and approved such aggressive actions on the part of the United States of 
America as in Iraq, Afghanistan, some others, and now is preparing for 
invasion of Syria. I think our president, who is trying to stop the 
bloodshed, who is trying to help resolve this conflict situation through a 
political dialogue, through diplomatic language, deserves this title 
more.199 
Although Putin has not won the prize to date, the view Kobzon expressed touched 
on a larger theme of perceived American hypocrisy and arrogance that evokes passion 
from many Russians, including Putin himself. The Russian president has often asserted 
that the American exceptionalism that has prompted U.S. interventions in sovereign 
states has resulted in a destabilized world. The March 18, 2014, Crimean annexation 
speech afforded Putin yet another opportunity to denounce what he perceives as 
American hypocrisy. “Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on 
and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades,” he said.200 
“Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
international law in the practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. . . . They have come 
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to believe . . . that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be 
right.”201 
During the speech, Putin enumerated several instances of U.S.-led foreign 
interventions—Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—and highlighted Washington’s 
selective use of U.N. Security Council resolutions when they advanced the American 
agenda. He specifically referred to the non-U.N. sanctioned NATO bombing of Serbia in 
1999 and the overstep of the 2011 U.N. Security Council resolution that approved 
protection of civilians in Libya but was subsequently expanded without authorization to 
include bombings that supported regime change.202 Putin assuredly regretted Russia’s 
abstention from the Security Council vote on the resolution that authorized the NATO-led 
intervention in Libya.  
E. ARROGANCE AND HUMILIATION 
Aside from the perceived American exceptionalism and hypocrisy, Putin resents 
American arrogance and has accused Washington of trying to keep Russia down by not 
respecting its sovereignty and interests. As much of his thinking is carried over from that 
of Soviet leaders during the Cold War, comments made by former Soviet president 
Mikhail Gorbachev provide understanding of Putin’s viewpoint. In August and 
September 1995, NATO allies bombed Bosnian Serb targets as part of Operation 
Deliberate Force. NATO allies informed Russian president Boris Yeltsin about their 
intentions only after the decision to conduct the bombings had already been made and the 
first bombings were imminent.203 In September 1995, former Soviet president Gorbachev 
commented in an interview that Russia’s weakness following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union had been exploited by the West.204 He stated that the policy of the United States 
and other Western European countries “is marked by a clear disrespect for Russia, as is 
shown by its failure to consult Russia on the issue of NATO bombings [in Bosnia] . . . . 
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All this proves that some Western politicians would have liked to see Russia play second 
fiddle in world politics. . . . Whatever Russia’s domestic problems, it will never reconcile 
itself to such a humiliating position.”205 Russia’s military actions in Georgia and Ukraine 
under Putin’s leadership attest to the cogency of Gorbachev’s assessment of Russian elite 
attitudes. 
Almost twenty years later, Putin echoed Gorbachev’s sentiments during his 
Crimean annexation speech: 
They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an 
independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things 
like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to 
everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, 
playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.206 
Putin framed the issue in Ukraine as one where an untrammeled Russia was 
acting to secure its national interests, much like the United States had acted on multiple 
occasions in the years leading up to the Russian invasion of Crimea. Attempts by the 
United States to condemn Russian actions were promptly met with accusations of 
hypocrisy. Putin’s risk-acceptant decision to “start work on returning Crimea to Russia” 
may have been due in great part to opportunism, but his view of Western leaders, Obama 
in particular, and their perception of him must have figured into his calculations.207 The 
hybrid means of Russia’s military action flew beneath the radar of the United States’ and 
NATO’s set reaction patterns.208 Putin’s assessment on how far Russia could go without 
triggering a major U.S. and Western military response was correct—the invasion of 
Crimea did not turn the post-Soviet “cold peace,” as described by Boris Yeltsin, into a 
hot war.209 
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F. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS 
In the time since Crimea’s formal annexation, hard questions for both state 
leaders have remained. For President Obama, the difficult question, as Angela Stent 
points out, is “how far the United States should allow its policies to be shaped by an 
acknowledgement of Russia’s post-Soviet preoccupations and continuing suspicion of 
American intentions.”210 Stent reprises the words of German General Klaus Naumann, 
asking if the United States suffers from “‘empathy deficit disorder’ when it comes to 
dealing with Russia.”211 Obama’s vice president, Joe Biden, provided initial promise in 
answering this question by offering some enlightened wisdom in his 2009 interview. “It 
is never smart to embarrass an individual or a country when they’re dealing with 
significant loss of face,” he advised. “My dad used to put it in another way: Never put 
another man in a corner where the only way out is over you. It just is not smart.”212 
According to Putin, however, putting Russia in a corner with regard to Ukraine was 
exactly what the United States did when it interfered in Kiev’s internal politics.213 
Obama’s statements and actions—including his first meetings and assessments of Putin, 
the attempted reset in relations, the red line in Syria, and being caught unaware in the 
Ukraine crisis—provide a strong case that Washington does lack empathy when dealing 
with Russia.  
For Putin, the difficult question is one that still looms since it was first posed by 
James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, the year before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union—can Russian leaders find a “non-chauvinist identity for themselves: a way of 
feeling good about themselves without feeling hostile to others?”214 Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine do not provide hope for answering this question in the affirmative, but they do 
highlight Russia’s ongoing effort to reshape its post-Soviet identity. While Putin’s 
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decision to intervene in Ukraine was largely motivated by the desire to assert Russia’s 
sovereignty within its perceived sphere of interests and display its independent role in 
international affairs, it also represented a concerted effort to strengthen Russia’s national 
identity and, in the process, shore up Putin’s domestic support to keep him in power. 
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IV. BOOSTING DOMESTIC SUPPORT AND FORGING A 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Ukraine is my Homeland. Russian is my native language. And I would 
like to be saved by Pushkin. And delivered from sorrow and unrest, also 
by Pushkin. Pushkin, not Putin.215 
—Facebook post of an ethnic Russian in Ukraine 
 
Stretched across the Kievan sky on a bluff that overlooks the Dniepr River, a 
glistening titanium arch frames a massive bronze statue of two Soviet workers beneath its 
span. One worker is Ukrainian, and the other is Russian. Together they hold aloft the 
Soviet Order of Friendship of Nations. The two nations share many historical and cultural 
ties to their ancestral state of Kievan Rus. The monument stands as an anachronistic relic 
of a bygone era, however. Time, with the assistance of Vladimir Putin, has withered the 
former Soviet friendship to its present post-Soviet adversarial relationship. At the root of 
such a deterioration in relations lies the complex and ever-present issue of both Ukrainian 
and Russian national identity. 
For many who comprise the older Russian generations, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was a traumatic life event. The Soviet Union, the world military and technological 
superpower that boasted the grand achievements of defeating Nazi Germany in the Great 
Patriotic War and reaching the cosmos first, disintegrated into oblivion. The entire Soviet 
system of principles and norms—the only system people had known their entire lives—
vanished in an instant. Along with the loss of their Soviet identity disappeared their state-
planned economy and communist government. Chaos reigned during the years following 
the USSR’s collapse as the new Russian state’s leadership struggled to fill the immense 
void. 
Before its demise, the Soviet Union was a highly industrialized state, and many of 
its productive sectors were localized among its fifteen republics. Not only did its collapse 
sever the economic limbs of these sectors and render them inoperable, but the Soviet 
legacy also left the republics institutionally ill-prepared for the transition to market 
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capitalism. Private property, market prices, and banks in the Western sense were all novel 
concepts to the former Soviet citizenry. At the time of Russia’s economic transition, 
Russia’s fledgling government struggled to establish its footing, battling its own 
weaknesses and seeking to enact democratic reforms while fending off resurgent 
communist attempts to return to power. In the ensuing turmoil, people witnessed 
unrestrained fluctuations of currency value and saw their entire life savings obliterated by 
hyperinflation. Lawlessness prevailed as rampant violence, alcoholism, drug abuse, theft, 
and corruption cast their dark shadows over society. Pensioners received no pension 
payments, and wage earners received no wages. For most Russians, the decade following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which saw a 40% decline in the country’s economy and 
a complete financial collapse in 1998, was an emotional, distressful period never to be 
forgotten.216  
With the dawn of the millennium came a new Russian leader who promised to 
strengthen the state and forge a new Russian identity while preventing a slide back to the 
turbulent times of the 1990s. In the process, he would take measures to accumulate great 
power at the expense of those who elected him through ostensibly democratic means. The 
extent of the power and control he acquired was so vast that he would go to great lengths 
to preserve it. As Vladimir Putin’s domestic support waned due to increasing levels of 
political discontent and opposition, he opportunistically used the political uncertainty in 
Ukraine following the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s government to shore up his 
popularity. This chapter explains how, by committing the Russian military to its hybrid 
intervention in Ukraine, Putin’s decision boosted his domestic support while 
simultaneously reinforcing the concept of a Russian ethnic identity. It reviews the 
background behind Putin’s social contract of providing stability in exchange for political 
indifference, and clarifies how Putin reinforced Russia’s hybrid democracy by 
consolidating executive power in the Russian government, media, and economy. It also 
reveals the increasing frailty of Putin’s social contract, which led to mass political 
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demonstrations in 2011–2012, and contributed to Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine 
and endeavor to strengthen the ethnic Russian identity. 
A. A STRONG LEADER AND STABILITY 
Many Russians consider Putin a strong leader who saved Russia from the chaos of 
the 1990s and brought stability—a point he himself often stresses. In his first address to 
the Federal Assembly in 2000, Putin declared, “Decades of difficult and unstable life are 
a long enough time to demand real changes for the better. . . . I am certain that we have 
enough sense and will. If this is so, there will be a result. And then we will have stability 
and national progress. Russia will have success and prosperity.”217 Vowing to never 
again allow such chaos to return, Putin pledged to stabilize and improve living standards 
through a stronger economy.218  
Less than a year later, Putin already began claiming credit for the return to order: 
“The Russian economy experienced growth rates unseen in almost 30 years in 2000 . . . 
and people are finally being paid their wages and pensions on time for the first time in 
years. But this is all still not enough . . . Our people continue to have very low living 
standards.”219 Putin’s claim that he was responsible for the economic turnaround is open 
to debate. Some argue that based on rising commodity prices, Russia would have still 
seen rapid economic progress no matter who the leader of Russia was at the time.220 
Putin would never admit this assessment, however, as doing so would undermine his 
main claim to why he should continue leading Russia—his continuing fulfillment of an 
unspoken social contract with the Russian people. 
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1. Social Contract and Hybrid Democracy 
As part of his social contract, Putin promised stability, predictability, and 
increased standards of living in return for Russian citizens’ continued apathy towards and 
non-participation in politics.221 Russian history and culture explain much as to why 
Russians have agreed to such a contract for stability, which, in turn, has prevented the 
full-fledged establishment of liberal democracy in Russia. As Yale Richmond observes, 
Russians are “likely to be defenders of the status quo. Their cruel climate, harsh history, 
and skeptical outlook on life have caused Russians to value stability, security, social 
order, and predictability, and to avoid risk. The tried and tested is preferred over the new 
and unknown, and with good reason.”222 This concept, aided by Russia’s tumultuous 
tsarist and communist history, has habituated the Russian people to authoritarian rule. 
Richmond concludes that “the result has been a usually submissive citizenry, accustomed 
to—indeed expecting—direction from above, being told what to do and what to 
think.”223 As part of the social contract, Putin and the state tell the Russian people what 
to do—or not do, politically speaking—and the state-controlled media tells them what to 
think. 
In 1989, two years before the fall of the Soviet Union, George Kennan provided a 
prescient observation of the difficulty Russia would face if it ever tried implementing a 
truly democratic form of government:  
Forms of government and the habits of governments tend over the long 
run to reflect the understandings and expectations of their peoples. The 
Russian people, like a number of other peoples of the Soviet Union, have 
never known democracy as we understand it. They have experienced next 
to nothing of the centuries-long development of the discipline of self-
government out of which our own political culture has evolved.224 
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The “sovereign democracy” championed by Putin has served as an acceptable 
substitute for most Russians who have never known true democracy. Known by other 
names, names such as authoritarian democracy, vertical of power, managed democracy, 
or hybrid regime, the main defining characteristic of Russia’s form of governance is the 
same: it combines elements of a democracy—such as universal suffrage—that are 
overshadowed by autocratic elements.225 Russia, rather than being the dictatorship that 
many call it, is actually “an innovator and even a leading ‘global supplier’ in subverting 
democratic content without establishing full-fledged dictatorship,” as Nikolai Petrov, 
Masha Lipman, and Henry Hale contend.226 In their view, three main features 
characterize the Russian hybrid regime: a highly centralized government, formal 
democratic institutions, and substitutions of the democratic institutions by the centralized 
authorities.227 
Maintaining a hybrid regime that portrays a democracy is useful to Russia’s 
leadership. The pseudo-democratic system allows the ruling elite to pursue the regime’s 
interests while professing to serve society’s interests.228 While many attribute the rise of 
the Russian hybrid regime to President Vladimir Putin, its foundations were actually laid 
by Russia’s first democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin.229  
B. FROM COMMUNISM TO AUTHORITARIANISM 
Two major events precipitated the Russian hybrid regime’s emergence during 
Yeltsin’s era: the 1993 parliamentary confrontation and the 1996 presidential election.230 
The first major event resulted in the somewhat weak presidential powers being greatly 
expanded. Having struggled for power with the Russian parliament since assuming the 
presidency, Yeltsin dissolved the parliament on September 21, 1993. After the parliament 
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countered by voting to impeach Yeltsin and holed themselves up in the White House, 
Yeltsin sent in troops and tanks to dislodge them. Following an intense 10-day standoff 
and confrontation, Yeltsin emerged victorious on October 4, 1993. In the months 
following the crisis, the Russian Constituent Assembly passed a new constitution, thereby 
creating a new legislature with two houses, the Federation Council and the State Duma. 
Additionally, it dissolved the regional legislatures and dramatically shifted political 
power to the executive branch.231 After the vote to pass the constitution, Yeltsin 
commented, “Russia needs strong power. Russia needs order. People are irritated at the 
impotence of the government. The constitution gives us an opportunity to install order in 
a legal way.”232 The 1993 constitution significantly increased Russian presidential 
authority. 
The second major event was the 1996 presidential election, which served as a 
people’s referendum that pitted support for Yeltsin’s reform policies against the desire to 
move back towards communism. Faced with such a monumental people’s decision, 
Yeltsin turned to the oligarchs and their television channels to flood the airwaves with 
pro-Yeltsin messages.233 Through the use of black propaganda—falsified documents, 
unsigned advertising, paid newspaper articles, dirty tricks, and disinformation—and mass 
media domination, Yeltsin defeated his Communist-party opponent Gennady Zyuganov 
54.8% to 40.3%.234 The election served as a convincing example to Yeltsin and his elites 
of just how powerful and effective electoral manipulation can be.235 
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1. Undemocratic Succession 
Yeltsin used the guise of democracy to transfer power to his chosen successor, 
Vladimir Putin. Impressed with Putin’s loyalty to St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak 
and hoping to be afforded the same after leaving office, Yeltsin completed Putin’s 
meteoric rise from obscurity to preeminence. First appointing him as head of the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) and then as Prime Minister, Yeltsin resigned his presidency in 
1999, causing Putin to become the acting president.236 On his first day in office, Putin 
pardoned Yeltsin for any infractions he may have committed and granted him immunity 
from any future prosecution. In the next few months, with the benefit of incumbency, 
access to oligarch Boris Berezovsky’s Channel 1 television network, and manipulation of 
the second Chechen war, Putin collected 53% of the presidential election votes, far ahead 
of the second place candidate with 29%.237 As Yuri Levada argues, “the constitutional 
mechanism of rotation and transfer of power still operates according to the Soviet model: 
the authorities nominate their candidates, and the people approve them.”238 Vladimir 
Putin’s unprecedented rise to power validates Levada’s claim.  
2. Consolidation of Executive Power 
Obtaining the presidency through elections that conveniently legitimized his 
office, Putin set to work molding the hybrid regime where Yeltsin left off. To consolidate 
power at the executive level, he created seven federal administrative districts to “realize 
the constitutional authority of the President of the Russian Federation.”239 Specially-
appointed presidential representatives would head each federal district and fill a seat on 
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the Federal Security Council, thus increasing the president’s ability to coordinate federal 
agency operations in the regions throughout Russia.240 
Putin also instituted a party system wherein one party would dominate all others 
in elections and subjugate both the Federation Council and the State Duma.241 The Unity 
political party had been the key to almost every winning coalition in the Duma during 
Putin’s first few years in office. Putin’s parliamentary managers engineered Unity’s 
conglomeration with the Fatherland/All Russia party to establish the new dominant party, 
United Russia.242  
Controlling the United Russia party enabled Putin to control the Duma, as party 
parliament members relied on the Kremlin to remain on the party list and maintain their 
seats.243 As for the Federation Council, in 2000, Putin succeeded in overhauling the 
process whereby Council members are chosen; instead of the regional chief executives 
and legislative officials filling the seats, the chief executives and the legislatures of the 
federal territories choose the Council members.244 As Thomas Remington notes, the 
Federation Council follows the Kremlin in lockstep, resulting in “guaranteeing 
overwhelming majorities for almost every piece of legislation that the Kremlin 
supports.”245 With a loyal dominant party and control over both chambers of the 
legislative branch, Putin effectively extended his grasp on the federal government. 
3. Harnessing the Energy Champions 
Putin also moved to consolidate control over the large energy companies. In his 
1996 St. Petersburg Mining Institute PhD thesis, a large portion of which was reportedly 
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plagiarized, Putin argued for the creation of national energy champions.246 “Regardless 
of who is the legal owner of the country’s natural resources,” he wrote, “the state has the 
right to regulate the process of their development and use.”247 During his first few years 
as president, Putin enacted the creation of these national champions, overseeing the re-
nationalization of former Soviet energy companies that the state sold during the massive 
privatization effort in the mid-1990s. He also seized the opportunity to rid himself of 
oligarchs and political foes who threatened the totality of his power.  
In November 2000, after being threatened with imprisonment, Boris Berezovsky 
sold his shares of his company, Sibneft, at a fraction of their worth to fellow oligarch 
Roman Abramovich and fled to England; Abramovich, in turn, sold the shares to the 
Russian state.248 In October 2003, state authorities arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
Russia’s richest man, for tax evasion and fraud and sentenced him to ten years in prison 
while his oil company, Yukos, was completely dismantled.249 State-owned Gazprom 
acquired Berezovsky’s Sibneft while state-owned Rosneft acquired Khodorkovsky’s 
Yukos assets. Thus, Putin’s energy national champions were born.  
In addition to the energy giants, Putin also moved swiftly to claim the privately-
owned media assets through state-owned company takeovers. After much pressure, 
oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky sold his NTV television channel—the first privately-owned 
network—to Gazprom in 2001.250 Around the same time, Putin moved to close the deal 
on ORT, or Channel 1—the very network owned by Berezovsky that had helped Putin 
obtain office. Berezovsky recalled Putin as saying, “I want to run ORT. I personally am 
going to run ORT.”251 When Berezovsky objected, Putin chided him: “You, you were 
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one of those who asked me to be president. So how can you complain?”252 Apparently 
Putin did not want to have the powerful Berezovsky—the kingmaker, founder of the 
Unity political party, and owner of Sibneft and ORT—near him as president and found a 
way to get rid of him.253 
4. Controlling the Media and the Legal System 
Although Russia’s three main television networks and multiple other forms of 
mass media are controlled by the state, a few independent media sources have been 
allowed to operate. Instead of snuffing them out, Putin’s regime has used them to lessen 
the perception that freedom of expression is restricted.254 Despite the important issues 
that the free and independent news outlets bring up, the benefits of independent 
journalism are marginalized by the lack of political competition and the bending of the 
judicial system towards the Kremlin.255 Additionally, the state’s manipulation of the 
media markets results in most of the population getting their information from the state-
controlled media. In 2008, 88% of Russian citizens reported watching the news on state-
owned Channel 1, whereas only 22% watched news on independently owned REN-
TV.256 Consequently, most Russians are fed with Kremlin-sponsored propaganda that 
tells them how the state is actively providing stability, strong leadership, economic 
growth, and international prestige.257 
Putin’s hybrid regime also uses the Russian legal system as an instrument to 
pursue its political will. Some describe the judicial process in Putin’s era as a dictatorship 
of law. In other words, Russia’s rulers today use the law to control society rather than use 
it as a mechanism for the state and society to mutually limit each other’s behavior.258 
Kathryn Hendley provides two examples of legislation that illustrate how the system 
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“offers maximum flexibility to officials and minimal predictability to citizens.”259 In 
2002, the government passed an extremism law to fight terrorism that outlawed political 
parties not in alignment with the Kremlin. It also passed a 2005 Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) law that made NGO registration requirements vague, thereby 
creating an effective way to dispense with the NGOs disagreeable to the government.260 
Laws on embezzlement, fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering are also convenient 
tools for the ruling elite to usurp the power and wealth of unfavorable oligarchs and 
political enemies. Mikhail Khodorkovsky is perhaps the best-known example of Putin’s 
use of the legal system to rule by law rather than adhere to the rule of law.261 
5. Crony Capitalism and Corruption 
Of all Putin’s reforms since assuming the presidency, his overarching success has 
been the centralization of executive power. The Russian mass media has portrayed Putin 
as a strong leader responsible for the stability of society and has attributed much of 
Russia’s success to his personality. His power structure at the highest echelon, though, 
actually consists of the group of elite loyalists comprised of crony oligarchs, political 
technocrats, some market liberals, and the siloviki. Several of the Russian billionaire 
oligarchs from St. Petersburg, as Andrew Kramer and David Herszenhorn write, “are 
members of a close circle of friends, relatives, associates, colleagues from the security 
services and longtime advisers who have grown fabulously wealthy during Mr. 
Putin’s . . . years as Russia’s paramount leader.”262 Critics argue that these connections at 
the uppermost level of government have resulted in the theft of Russia’s prolific natural 
resources and illustrate the extent to which corruption pervades the government.263  
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6. A Stagnant Economy Propped up by Petroleum 
Much as Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev discovered during the last few years 
of the Soviet Union, a social pact with the populace can only be maintained as long as the 
economy is producing the desired results.264 With its economy dependent on sales of its 
natural resources of oil and gas, Russia constitutes a petrostate. In 2008, Russian energy 
exports comprised 49% of the federal budget and 63% of Russia’s total exports.265 Its 
hydrocarbon policies, as Lilia Shevtsova notes, have allowed Russia to “bully the West, 
and bludgeon neighbors such as Belarus, Ukraine, and former satellite states.”266 High oil 
prices allowed Russia for years to maintain the performance of its economy and, by 
extension, its stability and security. 
Putin’s over-reliance on Russia’s petroleum resources, however, has obscured the 
necessity of real—not illusory—economic reform. The result has been a stagnating 
economy with little genuine effort by the state at diversification. In the long term, 
Russia’s economic vitality is dependent upon high global petroleum demand and prices. 
In the short term, however, Russia has been able to weather periods of low petroleum 
prices and other economic downturns due to the impressive foreign capital financial 
reserves it amassed during the high oil and gas prices windfall of the 2000s. Russia’s 
stockpiling strategy, which boosted its financial reserves to a maximum of $537 billion in 
December 2012, has come at a cost, though. Recent years of declining oil prices have 
caused Russia to burn through its reserves quickly. In December 2015, the country’s 
reserves were down to $368 billion—a net reduction of $169 billion in a mere three 
years.267 
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C. A REGIME PRONE TO FISSURE 
Even with short-term economic complacency, which is made possible by large but 
decreasing coffers of financial reserves and constant political propaganda broadcast by 
the state-controlled media, Russia’s sociopolitical structure is prone to fissure.268 “When 
people start to take Putin’s initial state-building achievements for granted,” contend 
Petrov, Lipman, and Hale, “the governance problems that over-managed democracy 
generates are likely to become more pronounced and to erode popular support for the 
system’s leadership.”269 One such manifestation that attests to their argument was the 
2011–2012 domestic protests, which served to remove the veneer of Putin’s regime and 
reveal its cracks. 
1. An Exit-Minded Russian Middle-Class 
For most of Putin’s first two terms as president and term as prime minister, he 
maintained high levels of approval despite clamping down on democratic freedoms while 
imposing increasing control over the Russian political system, legal system, media, and 
economy. Those Russians who had been interested enough to follow and assess political 
developments were mainly middle-class Russians well-off enough that they did not need 
to buy into Putin’s social contract. Krastev refers to economist Albert Hirschman’s 
general observation that people, when presented with the deterioration of goods or 
services, have two main options by which they can respond—exit or voice.270 Whereas 
voice entails the act of vocalizing one’s discontent through protests, petitions, or 
complaining, exit is the act of switching to another product or service, withdrawing from 
an organization, or leaving a country.271 
For most people, exit is often used more than voice because it typically represents 
the path of least resistance, commitment, and time.272 Middle-class Russians dissatisfied 
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by the corruption of the political and economic system in Russia are no different. Citing a 
Russian economist’s figure that over two million Russian democrats exited the country 
during the 2000s, Krastev asserts that “Russia’s demographic situation—its aging and 
shrinking populace—and Russia’s weak national identity have made exit a very natural 
option for those who are disappointed with the regime. The emergence of an exit-minded 
middle class in Russia is at the heart of the regime’s survival capacity.”273 Krastev 
explains how this inclination to leave the country has helped Putin maintain his political 
support: 
The people who are the most likely to be upset by the poor quality of 
governance in Russia are the very same people who are the most ready 
and able to exit Russia. For them, leaving the country in which they live is 
easier than reforming it. Why try to turn Russia into Germany, when there 
is no guarantee that a lifetime is long enough for that mission, and when 
Germany is but a short trip away? The opinion polls demonstrate that 
Russia’s middle class prefers to work abroad and to come home to Russia 
during the holidays to see their friends and relatives. . . . The major reason 
why Russians are reluctant to protest is not fear; it is because the people 
who care most have already left the country or have resolved to do so in 
the near future.274 
2. A Significant Change in Willingness to Voice Discontent 
Notwithstanding the noteworthy number of Russian citizens who have exited or 
would rather exit the country than voice their dissatisfaction with it, a sizable opposition 
contingent has managed to exist, as was evident in the massive protests staged in 
Moscow from December 2011 to March 2012. Tens of thousands of people opposed to 
the reportedly manipulated 2011 Duma elections and the prearranged position switching 
in 2012 by Putin and Medvedev gathered in Moscow on multiple occasions, calling for 
free elections and a Russia without Putin.275 The New York Times quoted Russian 
journalist Yevgeniya Albats, who stated that the protests “proved that civil society does 
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exist and that this country is not lost.”276 Zinaida Burskaya, a 22-year-old Russian 
woman who participated in the protests, told the same newspaper that because “people 
have torn themselves from off their couches and have come here and are not apathetic,” 
she felt that what was taking place would “affect things over the next two to three 
years.”277 Little did she know how right she would be, although not in the manner she 
expected. 
Opposition leader and blogger Aleksei Navalny, who was regarded by the 
Kremlin as largely responsible for planning and coordinating the protests, must have 
struck a nerve with his political dissonance. Navalny was subsequently jailed on a 
spurious charge for a 15-day period that spanned the protest on December 10, 2011.278 
Freed in time for the December 24, 2011, protest, however, he told the gathered crowd 
that he saw that there were enough people there to take over the Kremlin: “We are a 
peaceful force and will not do it now. But if these crooks and thieves try to go on 
cheating us, if they continue telling lies and stealing from us, we will take what belongs 
to us with our own hands.”279 Having power taken from him is precisely what Putin fears 
most.  
3. Putin’s Fear of Losing Power through a Color Revolution in Russia 
The color revolutions of neighboring former Soviet republics—the 2003 Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the 2005 Tulip and 2010 
Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan—serve as vivid reminders to Putin of what may happen to 
governments when public discontent reaches a boiling point. For as much power as his 
political system grants him, Putin is limited by “what would spark an unacceptable level 
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of public protest, not to mention revolution.”280 At the time of the December 2011 
protests in Moscow, former Soviet president Gorbachev told a radio interviewer that 
Putin should give up his bid for a third presidential term.281 Noting that he himself had 
given up his power voluntarily 20 years to the same month earlier, Gorbachev asked, 
“What’s terrible about it? . . . Then all the positive that he [Putin] has done would be 
safeguarded.”282 For Putin, however, the loss of power would be terrible. 
All of his efforts to centralize his personal executive power and fortify his 
authoritarian system have caused Putin to view his hybrid system as forming the rightful 
epitome of Russian presidential power. In line with the principles of prospect theory, 
Putin’s perceived loss of the status quo would be more painful than any pleasure he could 
derive from any gain, especially considering his vast accumulation of personal wealth. 
Additionally, as Hill and Gaddy note, without Putin, the hybrid system of governance he 
built would cease to function: 
Only he can maintain the balance in contemporary Russian politics 
because he, personally, created the hooks and levers that compromise the 
central players and keep them in place. Vladimir Putin has ruled in the 
name of unity, of a united Russia. But the unity he has created is 
superficial and fragile. Putin did not solve the unresolved issues of the 
Russian and Soviet past that surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s. He merely 
suppressed them and papered them over with a pastiche of recycled 
Russian ideas.283 
For these very reasons—fear of the loss of power and the inability of the system 
to work without him—Putin and his regime became more risk-acceptant in their decisions 
calculated to maintain the status quo. Instead of following Gorbachev’s advice to step 
away from power, Putin ramped up his efforts to retain it as he pressed forward with his 
2012 reelection. Using crude and demeaning language, he labeled the numerous 
protestors as urban elites and provocateurs who were attempting to weaken Russia and 
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usurp power.284 Further deprecating the protests, Putin propagated the rehashed narrative 
that the West, led by the United States, was responsible for inciting the political 
opposition. In a speech to a group supporting his presidential bid on December 8, 2011, 
he accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of giving political opposition leaders 
in Russia the signal to proceed: “[They] heard the signal and with the support of the U.S. 
state department began active work. . . . We have to protect our sovereignty. We will 
have to think about strengthening the law and holding more responsible those who carry 
out the task of a foreign government to influence internal political processes.”285 
4. A Third-Term President 
In the months leading up to the March 2012 presidential election, the Kremlin 
employed a hand in choosing Putin’s opponents while barring any candidate that had a 
moderate chance of success.286 Putin used his status as the prime minister, as Shevtsova 
describes, “to exploit a panoply of state resources ranging from television time to 
financial carrots and repressive sticks with which to bribe or intimidate voters.”287 The 
usual Kremlin antics of election rigging prevailed. The March 4, 2012, election result was 
a Putin victory in the first round with 63% of the vote, although independent sources 
claim that he actually garnered only 46%.288 
On the eve and day of Putin’s re-inauguration as president on May 7, 2012, more 
protests against his return to the presidency took place. In what began as a peaceful rally 
on May 6, over 20,000 Russians gathered to express how they, in the words of one 
participant quoted by The Guardian, did not “want to live under Putin for the next 12 
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years” but wanted their “children to live without Putin.”289 The protests took a violent 
turn, however, as protesters clashed with police in riot gear by throwing rocks and beer 
bottles at them. The riot police, as journalist Miriam Elder described at the time, 
“responded with an overwhelming use of force, beating the crowd with batons and 
dragging people into waiting arresting vans, sometimes by the hair.”290 Authorities 
arrested over 250 people, including opposition leaders Alexei Navalny and Boris 
Nemtsov. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, describing the conduct of the police as 
mild, told the media that he would have liked them to act more harshly: “Protesters who 
hurt riot police should have their livers smeared to the asphalt.”291 
The energy behind the protests from December 2011 to May 2012, which some 
have called the “Snow Revolution” because of the white ribbons worn by protesters, 
seemed to have melted with the heat of the summer.292 Instead of continuing with the 
forceful methods it had used to deal with the May 2012 protests, however, the Kremlin 
used a softer approach—passing a series of seemingly liberalizing bills in the Duma. The 
legislation was merely a cosmetic remedy designed to assuage the growing political 
discord, however, for it had no mitigating effect on the hybrid government’s power.293 
D. PUTIN’S NEED FOR A DOMESTIC DIVERSION 
The mass demonstrations in Moscow as he endeavored to reassume the 
presidential helm showed Putin how fragile his domestic political support was. Putin’s 
approval rating dropped from an average of 75% throughout his terms as president and 
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prime minister to a low of 63% in December 2011—a figure around which it would 
founder for the next two years (see Figure 2).294 “As always in Russia, when the 
authorities feel pressed,” explains Shevtsova, “they repeat the old ‘besieged fortress’ 
refrain and launch a search for enemies at home and abroad.”295 Putin soon found the 
enemies and diversion he needed. The ongoing competition between Russian and EU 
economic initiatives in Ukraine set the scene. The Euromaidan movement and 
Yanukovych’s subsequent flight from office comprised the moment. The new Ukrainian 
government with its American and European backers, in Putin’s narrative, played the role 
of enemy. By making the decision to intervene in Ukraine, Putin not only extended his 
grip on his personalized political power but renewed his efforts to forge a new Russian 
identity by awakening nationalistic sentiment. 
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Figure 2.  Value of the Ruble and Putin’s Approval Rating 
During His Time in Power 
 
Source: “Approval of Putin Index,” Yuri Levada Analytical Center, accessed January 12, 
2016, http://www.levada.ru/eng/indexes-0.; “USD/RUB—U.S. Dollar Russian Ruble,” 
Investing.com, accessed February 14, 2016, http://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-
rub-historical-data.  
1. A New Russian Identity 
For most of the 20th century (1917–1991), the Russian identity was inextricably 
linked with the Soviet identity. Communism, multinationalism, military strength, and 
scientific and technological achievement were all facets of the Soviet identity that 
practically disappeared overnight for millions of Soviet citizens upon the collapse of the 
USSR. Burdened by a flailing economy and a dysfunctional government, Boris Yeltsin 
struggled to find an identity for Russia to replace its Soviet predecessor.296 A major 
difficulty lay in the fact that the Russian Federation does not constitute an ethnically 
homogenous nation-state. An identity built purely on ethnic Russian nationalism would 
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present difficulty in sustaining the federation, which is composed of many minority 
republics, including Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Tatarstan. One need only recall the 
Russian experience with the Islamic Chechen republic to see the fracturable threat to 
Russia’s federal integrity that ethnic nationalism can produce. 
With the multiethnic nature of the Russian Federation in mind, Yeltsin promoted 
the Russian civic identity as embodied by the adjective Rossiysskiy, which connotes the 
Russian state, as opposed to a Russkiy national identity based on Russian ethnicity.297 
When Putin took over after Yeltsin, the national question remained unanswered. In an 
address known as the millennium message that he made shortly before assuming the 
presidency in 1999, Putin rejected the idea of a state ideology but presented his form of 
the Russian idea that would produce unity.298 He defined the pillars of his idea as 
economic and social stability, traditional Russian values, a belief in the greatness of 
Russia, the renewal of a powerful Russia, and a strong state.299 Describing traditional 
values as patriotism, he said that it was comprised of “feeling pride in one’s country, its 
history and accomplishments” and that it was the source of courage and strength when 
“free from the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions.”300 
During his first few years in office, Putin remained notoriously ambiguous in 
terms of defining Russia’s identity. Yuri Teper describes how Putin “inconsistently 
combined diverse civic, ethnic and even some imperial components of Russian identity, 
without fully committing to any of them.”301 As part of his statist vision for Russia as a 
great power, he relied heavily on nostalgic elements from tsarist and Soviet history, such 
as tsarist-era Kremlin guard uniforms and revamping the Soviet anthem with updated 
lyrics to serve as the Russian national anthem.302 “For a time,” Teper explains, “this 
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policy enabled the Kremlin to retain space for significant political maneuvering and 
maintain broad public appeal, without the need to fully confront the highly controversial 
issue.”303 
As ethnic and religious minority migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia 
continued to flow into Moscow and other large Russian cities as the performance of the 
Russian economy improved, Russian ethnic nationalism and xenophobia grew. Preparing 
for his reelection campaign in January 2012, Putin addressed the diametric civic and 
ethnic national issue. In an editorial titled “Russia: The National Question” that he wrote 
for a Russian newspaper, he expressed concern that “attempts to preach ideas of building 
a Russian ‘national’ mono-ethnic state go against our entire thousand-year history.”304 
Putin continued to blur the identity issue by denouncing European multiculturalism while 
describing Russia as a “multiethnic civilization with Russian culture at its core.”305 In 
essence, Putin merely continued to conflate and obfuscate the identity issue in an effort to 
allay the constituent concerns in a Russia that, he said, “is neither an ethnic state nor an 
American melting pot.”306 
In view of Putin’s endorsement of the Eurasian Economic Union, many Russian 
nationalists became dissatisfied with Putin for not standing up for ethnic Russians while 
pushing for a Soviet-type union to the detriment of Russia.307 The participation of 
Russian nationalists in the 2011–2012 protests against the government catalyzed Putin to 
abandon his ambiguous stance on Russian national identity. As noted previously, the 
political instability in Ukraine in late 2013 granted Putin the opportunity to move forward 
with building a new Russian identity with a particular emphasis on Russian ethno-
nationalism. Teper summarizes the result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
narratives put forth by the Putin regime through the state-controlled media: 
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The nation replaced the state as the primary reference point for 
constructing Russianness. Previously, the Kremlin promoted the greatness 
of the state as the focus of an all-Russian identity. During the crisis, by 
suggesting Russia’s moral obligation to protect fellow Russkiye beyond its 
state borders and the need to reunite the divided Russkiy nation, Russia 
was unprecedentedly positioned as the nation–state of Russkiye and the 
champion of the Russian national cause. . . . After years of sitting on the 
fence, the Kremlin has reinvented itself as an active and initiating player 
in the nationalism field.308 
The idea of nationalism usually conjures up thoughts of love for one’s own 
nation, but the term, as Robert Gildea points out, was first used by Abbé Augustin 
Barruel, a French Jesuit priest, in 1798 to indicate hatred of a foreigner.309 National ties 
between people may include any combination of a common ancestry or homeland, a 
shared sense of history or destiny, or a common religion or language.310 Gildea, 
maintaining that a common language helps express the soul of a people, quotes an 1882 
lecture by Ernest Renan: “To have common glories in the past, a common will in the 
present, to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the 
essential condition for being a nation.”311 The new Russian identity narratives that have 
been broadcast from Russia’s intervention in Ukraine have highlighted the protection of 
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers from hated “fascists” in Ukraine in conjunction 
with the glorification of the past Soviet victory over fascism in the Great Patriotic War. 
The narratives have also celebrated the success of the Russian military in reclaiming 
Crimea and Sevastopol—the city of Russian military glory—while extolling a rebuilt 
Russian military capable of conducting warfare from the hybrid to the nuclear level. 
Additionally, the narratives have promoted the restoration of Russian greatness and the 
triumph of Russian values over their decadent Western counterparts. 
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2. The Crimea Effect 
The domestic reception of Russia’s actions in Ukraine was significant. By 
advancing the narrative that Russia’s intervention in and annexation of Crimea was to 
ostensibly protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers against a hostile enemy, Russia 
experienced a tidal wave of nationalism that boosted Putin’s popularity to unprecedented 
levels. Putin’s approval rating jumped from 61% in October 2013 before the annexation 
in March 2014 to a post-annexation level of 86% in June 2014 (refer to Figure 2).312 
Alfred Evans provides an explanation for the phenomenon: “In a society in which distrust 
of the public sphere is pervasive, one of the best ways to motivate people to cooperate in 
the pursuit of common interests is to arouse them to defend themselves from an 
immediate threat.”313 
The theme espoused by Putin and his media was the threat of encroachment of 
Western powers, institutions, and values. Rutland explains that Putin chose to pursue the 
Russian national identity in terms of security rather than economic well-being: “Putin had 
apparently come up with a national narrative that had deep emotional resonance for the 
Russian people. Unfortunately, his actions were anathema to Russia’s neighbors, and may 
well prove politically and economically unsustainable.”314 The situation in Ukraine 
presented itself as an opportunity both to regain some of what Russia had lost upon the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and to prevent the loss of his personal power. Overvaluing 
these two loss-averse prospects, Putin made the risk-laden decision to intervene in 
Ukraine even though such action would likely burden the Russian state and its populace 
with significant international political and economic costs. 
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V. RUSSIA’S FOREIGN RESERVES AND ITS SEEMINGLY 
IRRATIONAL THREATS THAT EMBOLDENED PUTIN 
Ukraine genuinely is a brotherly country in our eyes, a brotherly 
people. . . . We worked with Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Timoshenko, 
though they were considered to be completely pro-Western politicians. . . . 
Yes, we sometimes had fierce debates on economic matters, but we did 
work together. 315 
—Vladimir Putin 
 
In February 2014, the world channeled its attention to the Winter Olympics being 
held in the Black Sea resort town of Sochi, Russia. Only a few months earlier, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution that described the purpose of the games as an 
effort to build “a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal.”316 In 
this respect, Sochi’s selection as the host city designed to foster international peace was 
paradoxical.  
Less than twenty miles from Sochi stretches the border between Russia and 
Abkhazia—the Russian-backed separatist region locked in frozen conflict with Georgia. 
Less than 300 miles southeast of Sochi is Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, which found 
itself attacked by Russia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war over the status of South 
Ossetia, another Russian-backed separatist region within Georgia, and Abkhazia. Less 
than 300 miles in the other direction from Sochi is Simferopol, the administrative seat of 
Crimea. While at the Sochi games that were intended to promote peace, Russian 
president Vladimir Putin made the decision to employ hybrid warfare to invade and 
annex Crimea. Several factors emboldened Putin to undertake such a risk-laden action, 
the first of which was the high level of Russia’s foreign currency reserves—assets that 
would help Moscow withstand predictable Western economic sanctions. The seemingly 
irrational dual threats of economic and nuclear retribution, which would mitigate against 
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the severity of the Western sanctions and preclude a Western military response, also 
encouraged Putin’s decision. This chapter explores the contextual background of Russia’s 
international relations during the 2014 Winter Olympics, its energy and economic 
relations with its European neighbors, and its strategic nuclear messaging during the 
crisis in Ukraine. 
A. 2014 WINTER OLYMPICS 
To ensure the 2014 Winter Olympic Games would increase Russia’s prestige on 
the world stage, Russian leaders went to extreme lengths. They poured 51 billion U.S. 
dollars into Olympic construction projects—the largest sum ever spent on a set of 
games.317 The exorbitant construction expenses were not without critics, however. 
Russian opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martynyuk lambasted the 
corruption in the Russian government’s preparation efforts. In their independent report 
“Winter Olympics in the Subtropics,” they claimed that $25 to $30 billion, or 50–60% of 
the cost of the Olympics, was embezzled.318 “The Winter Olympics in Sochi is [sic] 
Putin’s personal project. He believed that the Olympic Games will be his triumph and . . . 
a recognition of his indisputable leadership, both in Russia and in the world,” they 
wrote.319 Rather than receive triumphal recognition of his leadership, Putin instead 
received the cold shoulder from several of the world’s heads of state and government. 
Absent from the opening ceremony of the games on February 7, 2014 were 
French president François Hollande, German chancellor Angela Merkel, U.K. prime 
minister David Cameron, and U.S. president Barack Obama. Although they refrained 
from providing specific reasons for skipping the ceremony, political disagreements over 
an array of Moscow’s policies were undoubtedly the cause. Frustration with Putin had 
continued to build for multiple reasons, including his role in the contest for economic 
                                                 
317 Owen Gibson, “Sochi Games Held Up as a Symbol of Olympic Extravagance and Waste,” The 
Guardian, February 5, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/feb/05/sochi-games-olympic-
extravagence-cost-winter-russia. 
318 Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martynyuk, Winter Olympics in the Sub-Tropics: Corruption and 
Abuse in Sochi, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, 9, http://www.putin-itogi.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2013/
05/Report_ENG_SOCHI-2014_preview.pdf. 
319 Ibid., 5. 
 85
influence in Ukraine between the EU and Russia, his domestic record on human rights, 
his support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and his granting asylum to Edward 
Snowden, who was criminally charged and wanted by the U.S. government for 
espionage. Notwithstanding the absence of the British, French, German, and U.S. leaders, 
many other leaders managed to attend. Chinese president Xi Jinping, Japanese prime 
minister Shinzo Abe, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkish prime minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, and even Ukrainian 
president Viktor Yanukovych, who was embroiled at home with the Euromaidan protests 
at the time, were present. 
Although Putin surely resented the snubbing he received from key Western 
leaders, he played up the event as an opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue 
with those leaders present. Touring Sochi’s Olympic Village a few days before the games 
began, Putin suggested that the gathering of leaders would be akin to a mini-UN summit 
at which he could “talk to colleagues about [issues such as] security, economy, the 
Middle East . . . Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, lots of them.”320 The presence of UN 
secretary-general Ban Ki-moon added to the air of international cooperation and 
furthered the impression of Russia’s arrival with prestige on the world’s stage.  
B. CUSHION OF FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES  
While the world focused its attention on Sochi during the Olympics, Putin 
focused his attention on Ukraine and Crimea. Meeting with his advisors in Sochi, Putin 
made an economic inquiry that would shape the fateful decision he would soon make 
regarding Ukraine. According to two officials, Putin asked his staff if Russia could 
withstand the economic repercussions that might arise should Russia take Crimea.321 
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With Russia’s international financial reserves at a level slightly less than half a trillion 
dollars, he received an affirmative answer.322 
A short time later, on February 22, 2014, Vladimir Putin convened a secret 
meeting with his Security Council in Sochi that continued until seven the next morning—
the day of the Olympics’ closing ceremony—to discuss Yanukovych’s flight from power 
and the situation in Ukraine. The group scrutinized possible Russian recourses, weighing 
the prospective costs and benefits of the available options. Armed with the assurance that 
Russia could withstand the probable economic sanctions because of its massive financial 
reserves, Putin ordered the “little green men” to “start working on returning Crimea to 
Russia.”323 
Had it not been for the cushion of reserves that the Russian Central Bank had 
accumulated during the prosperous times of high oil prices (see Figure 3), Putin might 
not have decided to press ahead with his hybrid military foray into Crimea.324 As former 
British ambassador to Russia Tony Brenton contends, the level of Russia’s financial 
reserves has served “as a proxy for Russian strength” that has factored into Moscow’s 
formulation of foreign policy.325 “Part of Russia’s international self-confidence has 
undoubtedly been the strength of the reserves,” states Brenton.326 When Russia 
conducted its military operations in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, its reserves were at the 
highest level Russia has ever accumulated—$596.6 billion.327 Just as this factor had 
spurred on Russian leaders to act in Georgia in August 2008, Russia’s level of reserves in 
February 2014—$498.9 billion—emboldened Putin to act in Ukraine. 
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Figure 3.  Russia’s International Reserves and the Price of Oil                        
Since the Fall of the USSR 
Sources: “International Reserves of the Russian Federation,” Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/Default.aspx?Prtid=mrrf_m;                   
“Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate,” Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DCOILWTICO/
downloaddata. 
C. RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE 
Another factor that mitigated the possible costs and risks in deciding to intervene 
in Ukraine was the Russian leadership’s assessment of the extent of the influence Russia 
wields among many European states because of its role as a major energy exporter. In 
2009, Prime Minister Putin commented that “Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral 
resources which serve as a base to develop its economy; [and] as an instrument to 
implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country on international energy 
markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence.”328 A large portion of 
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Russia’s international trade revenue flows into the state in exchange for the hydrocarbon 
resources—oil, natural gas, and other petroleum products—it pumps out. In 2013, Russia 
grossed $356 billion in oil and natural gas revenue, which constituted 68% of its total 
export revenues.329 Customs duties on oil and gas exports, combined with taxes on 
mineral extraction, produced 50.2% of Russia’s 13 trillion ruble (approximately $406 
billion) federal budget revenue in 2013.330 The same year, crude oil accounted for $174 
billion, or 33%, of Russia’s total export revenue.331 Petroleum products provided $109 
billion, or 21% of gross export sales, while natural gas exports produced $73 billion, or 
14% of total export revenue.332 
Because most of its federal budget (and the commercial revenue of companies 
with close ties to the Kremlin) comes from the sale of crude oil and other petroleum 
products, Russia has displayed a vested interest in sustained high oil prices. Some have 
even suggested that Russia’s support for and export of arms to Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, 
and Syria over the past decade has been part of an effort to keep oil prices high by 
maintaining a destabilized Middle East.333 
                                                 
329 “Oil and Natural Gas Sales Accounted for 68% of Russia’s Total Export Revenues in 2013,” 
Today in Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231. 
330 “Annual Report on Execution of the Federal Budget (Starting from January 1, 2006),” Federal 
Budget of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://old.minfin.ru/en/
statistics/fedbud/. 
331 “Oil and Natural Gas Sales.” 
332 Ibid. 
333 Writing about the return of Russia to Middle East politics with its open support of Syria and 
unwillingness to join other states in pressuring Iran in 2006, BBC Russian Service chief editor Konstantin 
Eggert wrote, “There are a few motives attributed to the Kremlin: First the new Russian ideology, assuming 
a partial revenge for Russia’s defeat in the Cold War; secondly, a new self-confidence due to high energy 
prices; third (which, perhaps, gives much to conspiracy theorists), the desire to maintain instability in the 
Middle East with the aim of maintaining high oil prices.”; Konstantin Eggert, “Возвращение или 
Турпоездка?” BBC Russian, August 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5244000/
5244282.stm; Alex Vatanka and Richard Weitz, “Russian Roulette—Moscow Seeks Influence Through 
Arms Exports,” Jane’s Defense Review, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1193365. 
 89
1. Gazprom—Russia’s Ultimate Geopolitical Tool 
Europe has been the main importer of Russia’s energy resources. In 2013, Russia 
provided 29% of the EU’s oil imports and 22% of the EU’s total oil consumption.334 The 
same year, Russia raked in $283 billion of crude oil sales—70% of which went to 
Europe—and other petroleum products abroad.335 Even though Russia’s export of natural 
gas abroad—90% of which went to Europe—provided only $73 billion in export revenue, 
natural gas has been the ultimate hydrocarbon tool that Russia employs to implement its 
foreign policy. Unlike oil, whose abundance of global suppliers has contributed to the 
overall decline of oil prices and provided Europe with more flexibility in choosing its 
energy trade partners, natural gas for much of Europe is provided by only one supplier—
Russia.336 In 2013, Russia provided 39% of the EU’s natural gas imports, or 27% of its 
natural gas consumption.337 The majority of Russia’s gas exports is through Gazprom—
one of Russia’s energy champions. The Gazprom behemoth maintains 72% of Russia’s 
and 17% of the world’s natural gas reserves and produces 72% of Russia’s and 12% of 
the world’s gas output.338 
In 2003, as Putin celebrated Gazprom’s 10th anniversary at a reception, he 
dismissed speculation about breaking up the energy giant, talk of which had been 
circulating at the time. “Gazprom, as a strategically important company, should be kept, 
and has been kept, as a single organism,” he said.339 “Gazprom is a powerful political 
                                                 
334 Peter Kiernan, “Russia, The European Union, and Energy Security,” The Fuse, May 30, 2015, 
http://www.energyfuse.org/russia-the-european-union-and-energy-security/. 
335 “Russia: International Energy Data and Analysis,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
accessed February 20, 2006, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS. 
336 Transporting natural gas is more difficult than transporting oil. While oil can be moved via 
pipeline, ship, train, or truck, natural gas must either be pumped through a pipeline or shipped in liquefied 
form (LNG) at an approximate temperature of -160 degrees Celsius. The latter is a technologically 
challenging method that requires extensive port infrastructure to accommodate LNG ships and results in 
gas that is roughly twice as expensive as that sent via a pipeline. 
337 Kiernan, “Russia, The European Union, and Energy Security.” 
338 “About Gazprom,” Gazprom, accessed February 20, 2016, http://www.gazprom.com/about/. 
339 Vladimir Putin, quoted in Catherine Belton, “Putin Says Gazprom Too Powerful to Break Up,” 
Moscow Times, February 17, 2003, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/putin-says-gazprom-
too-powerful-to-break-up/240360.html. 
 90
and economic lever of influence over the rest of the world.”340 As a lever, Gazprom has 
two instruments whereby it makes its influence felt: reward or punishment. As Randall 
Newnham explains, the Kremlin uses Gazprom to dangle “petro-carrots” or threaten with 
“petro-sticks” to gain compliance with its policies:  
States such as Georgia, the Ukraine and the Baltic States have been 
punished with supply interruptions and higher prices after their 
governments turned toward the West. Conversely, those who remained 
friendly to the Kremlin—such as Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine before 2005, 
and the tiny statelets [such as] . . . Abkhazia . . . and Transdniestria—have 
been granted ample oil and gas at subsidized prices.341 
To deliver its gas exports to Europe, Gazprom operates a network of pipelines that 
extends westward from Russia to the EU and Turkey (see Figure 4). The Nord Stream 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea and the Blue Stream pipeline through the Black Sea carry 
Russian gas directly to Germany and Turkey, respectively. In contrast, the Yamal 
pipeline traverses Belarus and Poland while the Soyuz (Union), Bratstvo (Brotherhood), 
and Trans-Balkan pipelines traverse Ukraine. Although Russia has used its ironically 
named gas pipelines as levers to influence its former Soviet brother states of Belarus and 
Ukraine, the latter states have some influence of their own. Given that the pipelines lie 
exposed across the transit states’ land, the Russian gas that flows through them is 
susceptible to their physical control. The result has been a double-edged sword for 
Gazprom and the Kremlin—cutting off gas supplies to a transit state entails the risk that 
the transit state will retaliate by cutting off or siphoning from the flow of gas to 
customers downstream. Such was the case during multiple wintry occasions referred to as 
the “gas wars” of 2006 and 2009. 
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Figure 4.  Major Natural Gas Supply Pipelines from Russia to Europe 
Adapted from Samuel Bailey, “Major Russian Gas Pipelines To Europe,” November 15, 
2009, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png.  
2. The Gas Wars of 2006 and 2009 
The first gas war was widely regarded as an act of Russian retribution for 
Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko’s re-
orienting of Kiev’s policies toward the EU and NATO. On January 1, 2006, Gazprom 
used the petro-stick by cutting off the supply of gas to Ukraine after it raised the price of 
gas from $50 per 1,000 cubic meters to $230—a price increase that Ukraine refused to 
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pay.342 Ukraine, which was experiencing a record level of gas consumption due to an 
unusually severe winter with temperatures below 30 degrees Celsius, responded by 
diverting some of the gas being pumped downstream to other European states for its own 
use to cope with the extreme cold.343 Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and 
Romania each experienced decreases of 25–40% in their Russian gas supplies until 
Gazprom restored the flow to Ukraine two days later.344 Russia and Ukraine resolved the 
price dispute by agreeing on a price of $95 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas for the next 
several months.345 This short-term agreement was but a prelude to many more disputes to 
come.  
As gas prices continued to rise in subsequent years, Russia repeatedly attempted 
to achieve parity among the contracted prices for Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of Europe 
(see Figure 5). With the significant decrease in oil prices in 2008 cutting into Russia’s 
export revenues and the global financial crisis the same year as a backdrop (refer to 
Figure 3), the stage was set for another imminent showdown between Moscow and Kiev. 
While the second gas war, whose effects were more severe than the first, would damage 
both Russia and Ukraine economically, the rest of Europe would haplessly suffer 
collateral damage. 
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Figure 5.  Gas Price Disparities between Belarus, Ukraine,                              
and the Rest of Europe 
Source: Simon Parini, “Russo-Ukrainian Gas Wars and the Call on Transit Governance,” 
in Dynamics of Energy Governance in Europe and Russia, ed. Caroline Kuzemko, 
Andrei V. Belyi, Andreas Goldthau, and Michael F. Keating (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 179. 
On January 1, 2009—exactly three years after the first gas war, Gazprom again 
cut Ukraine’s supply share of gas in response to another row over gas prices and 
Ukrainian gas debt. Ukraine paid $1.52 billion in gas arrears to Russia—all of its debt 
according to Ukraine, but only part of its $2 billion debt and fines according to Russia.346 
Additionally, the two states disagreed over a new gas price. Ukraine had been paying 
$179.50 per 1,000 cubic meters, but Gazprom insisted that it pay the market price of $418 
that the rest of Europe had been paying.347 The day after Gazprom stopped providing 
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Ukraine’s share of gas, other European states reported decreases in their respective gas 
pressures.348 A Ukrainian official, referring to the fuel gas needed to operate the pipeline, 
insisted that automatic “interruptions independent of people” for the EU were likely due 
to Russia’s withholding of Ukraine’s share of supply.349 
On January 6, 2009, at the behest of Russian prime minister Putin, Gazprom 
reduced the gas pressure intended for the rest of Europe by a compensatory amount 
commensurate with how much it alleged Ukraine had stolen.350 A day later, Gazprom 
shut off the gas flow completely. To provide for its own needs, Ukraine’s state-owned 
gas company, Naftogaz Ukrainy, operated the pipeline in reverse, closing off its pipelines 
between Ukraine and Russia, to supply its major population centers in eastern and 
southern Ukraine from its gas reserves in western Ukraine.351 
As the standoff continued, the urgency for the EU to help resolve the crisis, which 
adversely affected the inhabitants and economies of 18 European states, grew 
dramatically. Some of the most severely affected countries in Europe—Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and non-EU member Moldova—sent their own delegations to Moscow, as 
journalist Ian Traynor commented, “to plead with their former imperial overlord for 
mercy and for fuel to power the radiators for millions of households.”352 The EU stepped 
in and brokered a deal on January 12, 2009 that stipulated the resumption of Europe’s 
supply of gas while allowing for EU monitors to observe the flow in both Russia and 
Ukraine.  
Notwithstanding the accord, and much to the European Union’s consternation, the 
flow of gas to Europe was not restored. Each side blamed the other. “We opened the tap, 
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and are ready to supply gas, but on the other side, the tap is closed,” remarked Putin, 
attempting to absolve Russia of culpability.353 Putin added, “Nobody, no transit country, 
has the right to use its transit location to take other customers hostage.”354 At the same 
time, Naftogaz claimed that Gazprom deliberately opened an incorrect pipeline that 
would have forced the Ukrainian gas company to cut supply to a large portion of 
Ukraine.355 The European Commission was unable to verify the validity of either party’s 
allegations because the EU observers had not been granted access to gas supply control 
centers in either country. The president of the European Commission, José Manuel 
Barroso, expressed his frustration with both countries’ prime ministers in separate phone 
conversations. After a “robust” discussion with Putin, Barroso commented that the 
situation was “getting close to a breaking point. There is a feeling that Putin is being 
duplicitous, to put it mildly.”356 Despite the EU leadership’s vexation, there was little 
else it could do but coordinate the efforts of EU countries and unitedly continue to 
implore Moscow for a resolution. 
The EU had its opportunity at an emergency international gas meeting in Moscow 
called for by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. Although Russia originally intended 
the meeting to be a summit for the EU state leaders, those leaders declined to attend due 
to a Czech EU presidency request. The Czech Republic, which held the rotating 
presidency of the Council of the European Union, desired the EU to speak with one voice 
by sending only the EU’s selected delegation.357 Despite the EU’s best efforts, no 
definitive outcome was reached during the talks on January 17, 2009. Fortunately for the 
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Europeans, however, a five-hour bilateral negotiation session between Putin and 
Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, which took place later that evening and 
lasted into the next morning, resulted in an agreement. Emerging together at 2:30 am, 
they jointly announced the details of the accord: gas would be sold to Ukraine at the 
European price with a 20% discount for 2009 and at the full European price the following 
year. Meanwhile, Ukraine would continue to charge Russia the same transit price for gas 
destined for Europe as it had in 2008. With these terms set, Russia and Ukraine fully 
restored the flow of gas to Europe on January 21, 2009—two weeks after the flow to 
Europe had been cut off and 20 days after the gas war began. 
3. European Energy Vulnerability 
The 2009 gas crisis had grave implications for Ukraine and the rest of Europe. 
Some experts estimated that the episode cost Gazprom between $1.1 and $2 billion—
roughly $100 million per day—in lost revenue, whereas the cost to Ukraine was at least 
$100 million in lost transit fee revenue.358 Although Ukraine lost much less than Russia 
in absolute financial terms, the relative economic and political costs to Ukraine were 
much higher. Timoshenko’s acceptance of the deal on Putin’s terms infuriated 
Yushchenko, who criticized the terms as a defeat wherein the price Ukraine agreed to pay 
for gas was too high and the price agreed to charge Russia for gas transit was too low.359 
The gas deal drove the wedge in the two former Orange Revolution allies’ relationship 
even deeper. The increased gas prices would prove to be unsustainable for Ukraine’s 
flailing economy in recession. Poor economic performance and political discord 
contributed to a decline in support for the Orange government and a victory for the 
Russian-leaning Viktor Yanukovych in the February 2010 Ukrainian presidential 
election. Immediately upon entering office, Yanukovych negotiated a gas price discount 
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in exchange for extending the lease of Ukraine’s Black Sea Fleet port in Sevastopol to 
Russia for another 25 years.360  
For the EU, the 2009 gas crisis revealed the extent to which it was dependent on 
both Russia and Ukraine for its gas and how little leverage it had in resolving the issue. In 
the wake of the incident, European Commission president Barroso enumerated the EU’s 
lessons learned: the importance of solidarity and the cognizance that action must be taken 
to avoid similar occurrences in the future. “New Year’s is for fireworks and celebrations, 
not gas crises. This cannot become an annual event,” he stated on January 20, 2009.361 
“This painful episode is a sharp reminder that the EU needs to take energy security 
seriously . . . to ensure that our citizens are not left in the cold. . . . We have to be serious 
about diversifying and investing in Europe’s energy security future.”362 One such 
investment was in a new gas pipeline—the Nord Stream—that bypassed transit states yet 
still came from the same major supplier—Russia.  
The motives behind building and operating the Nord Stream pipeline, which 
carries gas directly from Vyborg, Russia to Greifswald, Germany under the Baltic Sea, 
have been questioned. During the lengthy process to get the project approved, Gazprom’s 
CEO Alexei Miller claimed that the “new export route . . . will increase Europe’s energy 
security.”363 Alexander Ryazanov, the former deputy CEO of Gazprom, offered a more 
candid explanation: “It is a rather expensive undertaking, because it is political. But of 
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course, we need this pipeline in order to exert pressure on Belarus and Ukraine.”364 
Russia sought to complete the pipeline to reduce its own dependence on unreliable transit 
states, like Belarus, Poland, and Ukraine. When the pipeline commenced operating in 
September 2011, Russia became more flexible in its capacity to use its petro-sticks 
against its former Soviet neighbors—Ukraine, above all—without having to worry about 
interruptions in supply to other clients downstream.  
Germany, for its part, also wished to reduce its dependence on the gas transit 
states and prevent future disruptions in supply. In so doing, however, Germany increased 
its dependence on Russia as the gas supplier. Faced with the dilemma between upholding 
its liberal political values, which would entail holding Russia accountable for its energy 
blackmail tactics, and promoting its geo-economic interests by forging ahead with the 
Nord Stream pipeline, Germany chose the latter. Upon doing so, Berlin disregarded 
Moscow’s reputation as an unreliable partner—the label it was given during the 2009 gas 
crisis—and its manipulative behavior toward Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Alexander 
Kotlowski explains the impact of Germany’s political willingness to favor its economic 
interests: 
The interlocking of German and Russian interests on an economic and 
political level is profoundly unsettling in Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic 
States, and some other Eastern European countries. . . . Regardless of 
general public reservations vis-à-vis Russian investments, the German 
energy conglomerates involved in the Nord Stream consortium are—not 
surprisingly—motivated primarily by the economic aspects of the pipeline 
and have complete disregard for the political consequences of the project. 
Nevertheless, the active role of the German government in securing 
financing for the Gazprom joint venture, combined with the engagement 
of the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (who made his 
preferences to Russia clear) as a Gazprom representative on the Nord 
Stream Board of Directors, accentuated the political rather than the purely 
commercial dimensions of the project.365  
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In November 2011, German chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian president 
Dmitry Medvedev cheerfully opened a ceremonial Nord Stream valve together during the 
pipeline’s inauguration. The display underscored how Germany’s foreign policy and 
economic decisions tend to favor amiable relations with Russia. On the outward 
appearance, Germany’s approach to Russia seems voluntary, but a closer inspection 
reveals how necessity is actually the driving force. In 2013, Russian gas imports 
comprised 45.8% of Germany’s total gas consumption.366 Not only are Germany’s 
leaders fully aware of their country’s dependence on Russian gas, but so too are Russia’s 
leaders. In a 2010 New York Times article, Judy Dempsey wrote about Putin’s recognition 
of European dependence on Russian energy: 
In an angry and often sarcastic speech to the top German industry chiefs at 
a business forum in Berlin, Mr. Putin lambasted the European Union, 
insisting that Brussels should consult Moscow over planned energy 
legislation. At one stage, he mocked the Europeans, saying if they did not 
want gas or nuclear energy, then they would have to rely on Russian 
firewood. “How will you heat your houses?” Mr. Putin asked. “You do not 
want gas, you do not want to develop nuclear energy. Where will you get 
your heat from then? From firewood? Even for firewood you will need to 
go to Siberia. You do not even have wood.”367 
D. THE SEEMINGLY IRRATIONAL THREAT OF A GAS WAR WAGED 
AGAINST EUROPE 
Many Germans dismiss the idea that Russia would engage Germany and the EU 
in a gas war. Citing how Russia’s economy is just as dependent on energy export 
revenues as are the European economies on Russia’s energy imports, they reason that 
Moscow taking such action would be tantamount to Russia’s economic self-destruction. 
Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s economics minister, while admitting that there is no 
reasonable alternative to Germany’s gas imports from Russia, insisted that there would 
not be a need to look for alternatives: “Even in the darkest hours of the Cold War, Russia 
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kept to its contracts.”368 Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s ambassador to the EU, likewise 
mocked the notion of Russia employing its natural gas weapon against the EU as “horror 
stories that have their origin in political fantasy.”369 For many European states, however, 
their gas vulnerability coupled with Russia’s history of using gas as a foreign policy tool 
constitutes a horror story grounded in reality. 
The degree to which each European state depends on Russian gas is as varied as 
the European states themselves (see Figure 6). Germany’s energy security vis-à-vis 
Russia is moderately vulnerable compared to other European states. Although it receives 
a large portion of the gas it consumes from Russia, Germany also has a modest gas 
storage capability that would allow it to survive a disruption of Russian gas for several 
months. A number of other states, some with conditions similar to Germany’s, are also 
moderately insecure: Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Romania. Most West European states—Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—import little to no gas from 
Russia and are, thus, much more energy secure. In contrast, most East European states are 
energy insecure. Two states—Estonia and Finland—receive all of their gas from Russia 
and do not have any gas storage capability. Until recently, Lithuania had a similar 
complete gas dependency on Russia, but the country has taken steps to diversify its 
import sources. Having constructed and opened an LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminal 
at the end of 2014, Lithuania now imports 20% of its gas from Norway and plans to 
import gas from the United States.370 Other Eastern European countries—Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia—have some gas storage 
capacity, but still import between 85% and 100% of the gas they consume from 
Russia.371 
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Figure 6.  EU Member State Energy Security and Vulnerability to Russian 
Natural Gas 
 
Adapted from Chi-Kong Chyong and Vessela Tchernova, “Europe’s Vulnerability on 
Russian Gas,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2015, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas. 
Russia’s leaders understand the various levels of energy security among EU 
member states. They have also sought to exploit these differences, striving to develop 
Russia’s bilateral energy relationships to undermine the cohesiveness and strength of EU 
energy policy and the European Union as a whole. Russia demonstrated this effort during 
the 2009 gas crisis when it tried to “continue playing the Europeans off one against the 
other,” as Roman Kupchinsky explains, by calling for an international gas summit with 
individual EU member state representation.372 In the face of Russia’s dominant energy 
position, EU leaders stressed then and have continued to stress the importance of 
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speaking with one voice. Despite claims that a scenario wherein Russia cuts its supply of 
gas to Europe is unlikely, the EU, nevertheless, conducted a hypothetical stress test in 
October 2014 to gauge how prepared it was in the event such a worst-case scenario came 
to fruition. Günther Oettinger, the Vice-President of the European Commission 
responsible for energy, discussed the findings: “For the very first time, we have a 
complete picture of the risks and possible solutions. If we work together, show solidarity 
and implement the recommendations of this report, no household in the EU has to be left 
out in the cold.”373  
While the official EU narrative painted a comforting picture of resiliency through 
cooperation, reports of the actual findings in the classified report are ominous. In the 
event that Russia cut off its gas supply, Germany would likely prioritize the needs of its 
protected customers—households—over industry. Wolf Richter examines the potential 
economic impact: 
Industry would lose much of its electricity as power plants that aren’t 
deemed indispensable would have to shut down. Forget heating those 
manufacturing plants, or turning on the lights, or booting up the robots. . . . 
Production would plunge. Layoffs would soar. The supply chain would 
collapse. A cut in gas supply would generate enormous economic 
costs. . . . With this move, self-destructive as it might be, Russia could lay 
waste to Germany’s industrial power, at least for a while, and it would 
wreak havoc that would then ricochet around the world as German export 
orders would remain unfulfilled, and as imports would grind to a halt. The 
costs would simply be too large to contemplate.374 
The use of harmful threats and actions to attain the foreign policy goals of 
Russia’s leaders was clearly demonstrated in the gas wars, but the tactic of intimidating 
and exploiting fears extends to the personal interactions of Russia’s leaders with their 
foreign counterparts. In 2007, German chancellor Angela Merkel met with Putin at his 
residence in Sochi to discuss energy trade matters. With Merkel seated next to him, Putin 
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residence in Sochi to discuss energy trade matters. With Merkel seated next to him, Putin 
called in his large black dog that ran up to Merkel and sniffed her as Putin commented, 
“I’m sure it will behave itself.”375 The chancellor, who had a pre-existing phobia to dogs 
from a dog bite she suffered in 1995 that was known to Putin, appeared visibly distressed 
during the encounter. 
Much like Merkel’s uneasiness over Putin’s dog, Europe has also been uneasy 
over the uncertainty of Putin’s level of restraint and the rationality of his actions. Not 
only did the 2009 gas crisis demonstrate how important Putin’s political objectives in 
Ukraine were to him, but it also revealed to the rest of Europe and the world just how 
irrational he could be. Such was the message he intended to send. Russia showed that it 
was willing to bear the cost of ruining its reputation as a reliable trade partner and lose 
billions of dollars in gas revenue over a seemingly insignificant matter—a price dispute 
with Ukraine. The threat that Russia could and would be willing to do so again was even 
articulated by Putin himself in February 2015. Speaking about how gas supplies to 
Ukraine could be suspended if it failed to prepay for its contracted gas, Putin warned that 
“This may create a threat to transit to Europe, to our European partners. We hope that gas 
supplies will not be interrupted. But this does not depend on us, it depends on the 
financial discipline of our Ukrainian partners.”376 Such a threat was clearly understood 
by the millions of Europeans whose gas supplies had already been cut once when they 
had needed them the most. 
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Crimea in February 2014, Merkel questioned 
Putin’s rationality, commenting that she was uncertain that “he was in touch with reality” 
as he seemed to be “in another world.”377 Thomas Schelling explained the rationality 
behind desiring to appear irrational in his eminent 1960 work, The Strategy of Conflict:  
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Even among the emotionally unbalanced, among the certified 
“irrationals,” there is often observed an intuitive appreciation of the 
principles of strategy. . . . A careless or even self-destructive attitude 
toward injury . . . can be a genuine strategic advantage. . . . One of the 
advantages of an explicit theory of “rational” strategic decision in 
situations of mixed conflict and common interest is that, by showing the 
strategic basis of certain paradoxical tactics, it can display how sound and 
rational some of the tactics are that are practiced by the untutored and the 
infirm.”378 
E. ANOTHER SEEMINGLY IRRATIONAL THREAT— NUCLEAR WAR 
The messaging of Putin’s irrationality—his clear willingness to sustain self-
damaging economic costs when threatening Europe’s energy security—has served as a 
useful deterrent against the West pursuing some of its more severe economic response 
options in the wake of Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea. Putin was aware of 
this, and it factored into his decision making regarding intervention in Ukraine. In a like 
manner, another irrational threat intended to deter the West’s military response options 
during Russia’s Crimean intervention, also factored into Putin’s calculations. The threat, 
which would overshadow the entire crisis in Ukraine, has been Russia’s possession of 
and willingness to use its arsenal of nuclear weapons to defend its hybrid military actions 
and gains. 
During the October 2014 Valdai conference, which was held in Sochi but eight 
months after the Winter Olympics, Putin commented that “We are sliding into the times 
when, instead of the balance of interests and mutual guarantees, it is fear and the balance 
of mutual destruction that prevent nations from engaging in direct conflict.”379 Later in 
his speech, he touted the nuclear brinkmanship of a seemingly irrational Khrushchev 
during the Cold War, implying that post-Soviet Russia demands the same level of 
respect: “We had such brilliant politicians like Nikita Khrushchev, who hammered the 
desk with his shoe at the UN. And the whole world, primarily the United States, and 
NATO thought: this Nikita is best left alone, he might just go and fire a missile, they 
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have lots of them, we should better show some respect for them.”380 Immediately after 
the “little green men”—Russian forces without insignia—appeared in Crimea, Putin 
backed up his nuclear insinuations with increased levels of Russian nuclear force activity 
and state-controlled media propaganda. Such provocative action elicited a response from 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that contrasted sharply with Putin’s words: 
Russia’s recent use of nuclear rhetoric, exercises and operations are deeply 
troubling. . . . President Putin’s admission that he considered putting 
Russia’s nuclear forces on alert while Russia was annexing Crimea is but 
one example. Russia has also significantly increased the scale, number and 
range of provocative flights by nuclear-capable bombers across much of 
the globe. From Japan to Gibraltar. From Crete to California. And from 
the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Russian officials announced plans to base 
modern nuclear-capable missile systems in Kaliningrad. And they claim 
that Russia has the right to deploy nuclear forces to Crimea. This will 
fundamentally change the balance of security in Europe. We learned 
during the Cold War that when it comes to nuclear weapons, caution, 
predictability and transparency are vital. Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling is 
unjustified, destabilizing and dangerous.381  
F. THE WEST’S RESPONSE 
Unwilling to risk the escalation of a military response, the EU and the United 
States responded to Russia’s actions in Crimea with varying levels of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. Diplomatic measures included cancelling the EU-Russia summit and 
isolating Russia from the G8 summit that was scheduled to have been held in Sochi in 
June 2014 but was held instead as a G7 meeting in Brussels. Other sanctions ranged from 
travel bans and freezing the assets of targeted individuals, who were deemed responsible 
for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to trade embargos against specific sectors like 
finance, energy (extraction technology to target Russia’s untapped oil reserves in the 
Arctic), and defense.382 
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The most prominent international trade casualty resulting from the West’s 
response to Russia over its actions in Ukraine was the Mistral amphibious ship deal. 
France had planned to sell two amphibious assault ships to Russia for $1.5 billion in what 
would have been the first major arms import deal for Russia since the end of the Cold 
War. The ships, named Vladivostok and Sevastopol, were designed to deliver soldiers, 
armored vehicles, and tanks from littoral waters to shore using the four landing barges 
and 16 helicopters that each can carry. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian 
Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, commented once that the Russo-Georgian war would 
have been over in “40 minutes instead of 26 hours” had the Russian navy possessed one 
of the Mistral ships in 2008.383 French president Hollande suspended delivery of the 
ships in September 2014 over the crisis in Ukraine, and France later refunded Russia’s 
money and sold them to Egypt. In a twist of irony, Putin’s decision to engage in 
operations that “reacquired” the port city of Sevastopol came at the cost of never 
acquiring the Mistral ship Sevastopol and its sister. 
Since June 2014, Russia’s economy has floundered as the ruble has greatly 
depreciated against the dollar. The effect that EU and U.S. sanctions—measures designed 
to alter Russia’s policies and behavior in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—have had on 
Russia’s economy is subject to debate. While a 2015 study found that “the impact of the 
conflict on Russia may be amplified by the sanctions imposed by Western countries,” its 
main conclusion was that “the bulk of the depreciation is caused by the decline of oil 
prices” (refer to Figures 2 and 3).384  
Whatever the effect that Western sanctions may have had on Russia’s economy, 
Putin has remained defiant over Russia’s actions concerning Crimea and the rest of 
Ukraine. In an interview with a Serbian newspaper in October 2014, he even doubled 
down on them. Responding to a question about the economic sanctions that were 
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designed to isolate Russia, he warned that the “the economic health of Europe and the 
world can be seriously undermined.”385 Later on he expressed his hope that Western 
leaders would “understand the futility of attempts to blackmail Russia and remember the 
consequences that discord between major nuclear powers can bring when the strategic 
stability of the world is at stake.”386 In his 2015 Valdai address nine days later, he 
affirmed that “Russia is not going to get all worked up, get offended or come begging at 
anyone’s door. Russia is a self-sufficient country. We will work within the foreign 
economic environment that has taken shape. . . . Pressure from outside, as has been the 
case on past occasions, will only consolidate our society.”387  
1. Billions of Dollars and No Sense 
At the all-night meeting with his security council in Sochi on February 22, 2014, 
the eve of the Winter Olympics closing ceremony, Putin postulated that the twin threats 
of economic and nuclear destruction issued respectively against the EU and NATO would 
have the desired effect. The EU’s collective energy security vulnerability due to its 
dependence on Russian gas would temper the severity of sanctions leveled against 
Russia, and Russia would be able to withstand the lesser sanctions with its billions of 
dollars in foreign capital reserves. Additionally, Russia’s strategic messaging of its 
willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend its actions in Ukraine would preclude any 
military response from NATO. The risk-laden decision that Putin made was a gamble that 
he was willing to take because of his aversion to the loss of a pro-Russian government in 
Kiev, among other reasons. The gamble in Ukraine to achieve his goals seems to have 
paid off in the short term, but the long-term sagacity of such a gamble remains to be seen. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis explored the rationales behind the decision by Russia’s 
political leaders to breach the territorial integrity of a sovereign state and acquire a major 
portion of it. Russia’s actions contravened its own security assurances given to Ukraine in 
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Russo-Ukraine Friendship Treaty to 
respect its neighbor’s sovereignty and border integrity. Additionally, Russia’s actions 
elicited strong condemnation from Western governments, resulting in Russia’s isolation 
from the West and economic sanctions designed to penalize Russia’s government. When 
the decision to invade Crimea was made, these costs that Russia’s leaders were willing to 
bear were determined to have been outweighed by the benefits Russia stood to gain 
through its actions. 
A military invasion and annexation of part of a modern European state seemed 
unfathomable to many Western leaders before Russia engaged in its shocking hybrid 
warfare in Crimea. Russia’s actions resurrected the idea of international political realism 
in the West, which many deemed to have been dormant since the dismantling of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Meanwhile, Ukraine 
remained fixed between the two competing strains of Western liberalism and Russian 
despotism. The jockeying between the West and Russia in fostering a favorably oriented 
Ukrainian government, as well as the attempts by both to include Ukraine in their 
respective institutional spheres—the EU and NATO or the Eurasian Economic Union—
placed Ukraine in a precarious geopolitical position. 
Given such a geopolitical landscape and Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan 
reorientation, the application of neoclassical realism, with its emphasis on both system- 
and domestic-level variables and its assumption of rationality based on expected utility 
maximization, is useful in explaining Russia’s reasoning for its Ukrainian intervention. A 
more plausible and durable exposition of the rationales influencing Russia’s leaders, 
however, can be obtained by combining the lens of neoclassical realism with that of 
prospect theory.  
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For Vladimir Putin, the reference point for Russia’s interests remains inexorably 
linked to the interests of the Soviet Union. Putin considers the demise of the Soviet Union 
an immense loss. His inability to make psychological peace with its end has caused him 
to perceive Russia’s current domain as one of losses. Such a worldview has reinforced his 
strong tendency toward loss aversion, or as Hersh Shefrin describes it, “get-evenitis.”388 
The speech that Putin gave when officially incorporating Crimea into the Russian 
Federation on March 18, 2014 oozed with resentment for the West. This speech revealed 
not only how closely the neoclassical realist paradigm aligns with his foreign policy but 
also the extent to which he is consumed by get-evenitis. J. M. Goldgeier and P. E. 
Tetlock describe why Putin’s actions in Crimea were perfectly justifiable in his own 
mind:  
Those who are less fixated on the world that is—and prone to give more 
weight to counterfactual worlds that could or should have been—are 
predisposed to be more sympathetic to redistributive claims on behalf of 
have-nots. Rather than viewing such claims as illegitimate, greedy, and 
self-serving bids for gain, they see them as just attempts to undo losses 
imposed by exploitative . . . nations.389  
Russia’s opportunistic intervention in and annexation of Crimea served as a 
convenient method for Putin to prevent the complete loss of Russia’s sphere of influence 
in Ukraine to the West and the loss of his popularity and power at home. At the same 
time, it afforded Putin a way to recover, at least to some extent, from the loss of the 
Soviet Union and to reconcile, to a certain degree, the discrepancy between the world that 
is and the world that, in his mind, should have been—and should be.  
Putin’s frame of reference and loss aversion caused him to be more risk-acceptant 
in undertaking military action in Crimea. His duplicitous exploitation of Western leaders’ 
naiveté and vulnerabilities prepared the geopolitical landscape in which Russian action in 
Ukraine could be taken to gain the intended benefits for Russia without incurring 
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excessive costs. Backed by Russia’s seemingly irrational threats to cut essential gas 
supplies to Europe and to launch nuclear attacks, Putin correctly anticipated a limited 
economic sanctions response and a negligible military response from the West. 
Emboldened by Russia’s large sum of financial reserves, he reckoned that Russia would 
be able to withstand whatever limited sanctions would result.  
By annexing Crimea, Putin furthered Russia’s interests in acquiring not only this 
peninsula, but also the strategically indispensable Russian Black Sea Fleet port in 
Sevastopol and the vast natural resources in the Black Sea region. Such action also 
prevented the expansion of Western institutions and influence in Ukraine. At the time of 
its intervention in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin issued 
several narratives that incited fervent ethno-nationalism and Russian patriotism: accusing 
the West of foreign intervention hypocrisy, vilifying the West for its involvement in 
Ukrainian affairs, and justifying Russia’s hybrid actions in Crimea as a humanitarian 
intervention to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers. The resulting level of 
Putin’s domestic approval was unprecedented—a perplexing development given the 
massive political protests that were held against him in Moscow and other cities but two 
years earlier in 2011–2012. 
A. BEYOND UKRAINE 
After the West isolated Russia and applied sanctions in response to its military 
actions in Ukraine, Putin would not wait long before thrusting Russia into another 
military exploit abroad—the complicated and dynamic conflict in Syria. While a full 
understanding of Russia’s rationales to intervene in Syria requires further analysis, the 
likely explanations are related to Russia’s rationales for intervening in Ukraine, as argued 
in this thesis. Possible explanations include exploiting the opportunity to divert negative 
global attention from the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, extracting Russia from its 
isolation by forcing the West to cooperate in deconflicting military efforts in Syria and 
seeking a peace settlement, and preventing the loss of a client by propping up a severely 
weakened Assad regime. Additionally, Putin’s move may have been motivated by the 
desire to elevate Russia’s international status by displaying its modernized conventional 
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military capabilities. Domestic considerations were also likely to have factored into 
Putin’s calculus. Russia’s actions in Syria allowed Putin to appear tough on terrorism, 
provided a new enemy for Russian nationalism to be kindled against, and maintained 
Putin’s high approval ratings.  
This thesis has demonstrated the explanatory power that neoclassical realism, 
supplemented by prospect theory, has in analyzing Russia’s rationales for intervening in 
Ukraine. The combined analytical framework is also apposite for interpreting Russia’s 
actions in Syria. For Western policy makers, the application of such a framework can 
assist in anticipating Russia’s likely rationales for actions that seek to weaken the West, 
as long as Putin remains in power, by undermining its strength, solidarity, and credibility. 
Such probable opportunistic action is not limited to the terrestrial domains of Ukraine, 
Syria, and other countries and areas replete with Russian interests—the Baltic states, 
Belarus, Moldova, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Arctic. It also includes the 
dynamic political, economic, maritime, celestial, and cyber domains of the former Soviet 
Union and the West. 
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